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I. INTRODUCTION 
The body of federal employment discrimination law in the United 
States is now about fifty-three years old, with most law emanating 
from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 The doctrine of em-
ployment discrimination law has been developed in a voluminous 
body of case law interpreting the lean statutory language of Title VII 
and the later-enacted laws, with the Supreme Court building a doc-
trinal core that has the appearance of order. There are two general 
theories of discrimination,2 disparate treatment and disparate im-
pact, which, according to the Court's chronicle, were expressed by 
Congress in separate subsections of Title VII and then in analogous 
provisions in the other employment discrimination statutes. These 
two theories of discrimination are distinct and fundamentally differ-
ent from each other, and their underlying principles cannot be mixed 
or blended. Associated with the two theories are proof frameworks or 
proof structures with ordered elements into which claimants must fit 
their evidence in order to recover.3 Satisfaction or nonsatisfaction of 
each step in the frameworks has a procedural effect in a case.4 There 
also are distinct defenses that are affiliated with each of the theories. 
The proof frameworks, defenses, and other tenets must be kept with-
in the theory with which they are associated. Moreover, it has been a 
somewhat implicit principle, which has become increasingly explicit, 
that there are only two theories of discrimination under Title VII. 
Additional types of claims that are recognized as actionable do not 
constitute new theories; instead, they must be classified under 
treatment or impact. One must categorize any employment discrimi-
nation claim as fitting under disparate treatment or disparate im-
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e-17). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was signed into law by 
President Lyndon B. Johnson on July 2, 1964, and it became effective July 2, 1965. Id. § 716a, 
78 Stat. at 266 (stating that the effective date shall be one year after the date of enactment). 
2. Presumably, there is a third theory-failure to make reasonable accommoda-
tions-under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as it is declared to be a type of 
disability discrimination by section 102. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012). The Supreme Court's 
decision that there is no separate cause of action for nonaccommodation of religion under 
Title VII does not necessarily call the separate theory under the ADA into question. See 
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015). 
3. Within disparate treatment there are individual disparate treatment claims and 
systemic disparate treatment claims, and each has its own proof frameworks. Int'l Bhd. of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 (1977). Both require proof of intent. 
4. In its opinion that created the pretext proof framework for individual disparate 
treatment cases, the Supreme Court explained the nature of what it was creating: "The 
critical issue before us concerns the order and allocation of proof in a private, non-class 
action challenging employment discrimination." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 
U.S. 792, 800 (1973). 
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pact, and then it can be analyzed using the appropriate framework. 
Dichotomies and categorization form the core of employment discrim-
ination doctrine. This is an orderly state of law, but it is only the ver-
isimilitude of order. 
It has become increasingly apparent that the two theories of em-
ployment discrimination are not really distinct, and the Court can-
not, and should not, avoid blending them. Contrary to the Court's 
proclamations that there are only two theories of discrimination,5 
there appear to be more, and there is a need for candid recognition of 
theories or causes of action beyond these two to properly evaluate the 
many types of claims. Below the level of the two theories, when 
claims are categorized as individual disparate treatment, courts and 
lawyers do not know which framework to apply to such claims, and 
forcing them into one or the other often obfuscates rather than facili-
tates analysis of the claim. This core of employment discrimination, 
which categorizes claims within distinct theories and then funnels 
them into proof structures, is a thin facade with waning theoretical 
integrity and increasing practical disutility. Yet, the Court has clung 
tenaciously to the perceived order, insisting that the exclusive theo-
ries can be maintained as a dichotomy and all claims can be pro-
cessed, and ultimately resolved, through the proof frameworks. 
Beyond the stultifying rigidity of this core based on dichotomies 
and categorization, the Supreme Court has demonstrated considera-
ble capacity for creativity in employment discrimination doctrine 
while declaring adherence to the core. The Court has at various 
points in the history of discrimination law recognized what I will call, 
although the Court will not, new theories to address invidious dis-
crimination. Notable among these innovations are recognition of the 
hostile environment sexual harassment theory,6 the sex or gender 
stereotyping theory,7 and the associational or relational theory. 
Two of the Supreme Court's employment discrimination decisions 
in 2015, Young v. United Parcel Service9 and EEOC v. Abercrom-
5. See, e.g., Sandra F. Sperino, Justice Kennedy's Big New Idea, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1789, 
1794 (2016) (stating that courts presume that disparate treatment and disparate impact 
"represent a complete description of the type of claims recognized under Title VII"). The 
Supreme Court and lower courts at times have referred to disparate treatment and dispar-
ate impact as theories of discrimination and at other times as causes of action. See infra 
Part IV.B.1. Regardless of the term used for these overarching concepts, the categorization 
of a claim under them is important because the applicable proof frameworks, defenses, and 
other principles flow from such classification. 
6. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
7. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
8. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170 (2011). 
9. 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). 
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bie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 0 facially proclaim the stability of the old or-
der but substantively reveal that the Court is willing to innovate and 
diverge from the established core of rigid dichotomies. In both deci-
sions, the Court engages, to some extent, in the supposedly anathe-
matic blending of disparate treatment and disparate impact, alt-
hough the Court disclaims such heresy. The opinions also employ the 
dichotomy of individual disparate treatment proof structures. Young 
uses the pretext analysis creatively but in a way that undermines its 
meaning and significance. Abercrombie & Fitch employs the mixed-
motives analysis while tacitly revealing the reason why the dichoto-
my of individual disparate treatment proof frameworks must be 
abandoned. Rather than suggesting chaos in employment discrimina-
tion law, the two decisions hold promise for its improvement. Such 
improvement, however, is only likely to be realized to a significant 
degree if the Court follows up these decisions by acknowledging first, 
the demise of the dichotomies of theories and proof frameworks and 
second, the variety of theories or causes of action that it already has 
recognized. 
In a third decision in 2015, the Court rendered an opinion that 
could further undermine the core of employment discrimination law, 
although the case was not an employment discrimination case. In Tex-
as Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Com-
munities Project, Inc., the Court held that the disparate impact theory 
is available under the Fair Housing Act (FHA)." The majority opinion 
analyzed the issue under the FHA by tracing the development of dis-
parate impact under employment discrimination laws. The opinion 
blithely undermines the axiom that the Supreme Court gleaned dis-
parate treatment and disparate impact from separate subsections of 
Title VII. 2 If Congress did not articulate the theories in separate stat-
utory provisions, the argument for theoretical distinctiveness and the 
imperative for never blending principles is less compelling.13 
Understanding what drove the Court to render these three opin-
ions that furtively diverge from the established core yields insights 
into the current disarray masquerading as order in employment dis-
crimination law. Such understanding also could provide a construc-
tive way to move forward with forging a simpler, less rigid, less ritu-
alistic, and more coherent body of law that more effectively addresses 
the actual occurrences of discrimination in the workplace. The new 
10. 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015). 
11. 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2015). 
12. Id. at 2519. See Sperino, supra note 5, at 1791. 
13. Sperino, supra note 5, at 1815 (stating that "Justice Kennedy's reading of Title VII 
invites courts to disregard the accidental dichotomy created in Griggs."). 
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doctrine would not be based on an exclusive dichotomy of theories or 
frameworks. It would recognize a variety of theories or causes of ac-
tion and not insist upon strict separation of theories and nonblending 
of principles associated with theories. At a time when many scholars 
are arguing for recognition of new theories of discrimination to ad-
dress the veiled, unconscious, or institutional discrimination that is 
more prevalent in society and the workplace today,1 4 the Court's opin-
ions in Young and Abercrombie & Fitch give reason for optimism. 5 
However, those decisions also should foment pessimism, as the Court 
diverged from the old core but simultaneously proclaimed that it was 
not doing so. Both decisions reveal a Court that implicitly recognizes 
the broken core doctrine and that teeters on the brink of diverging 
from the restrictive dichotomies. Alas, the Court cannot break from 
the appearance of order. 
Part II examines the evolution of principles that are at the core 
of employment discrimination law: the dichotomy of discrimination 
theories and the dichotomy of individual disparate treatment proof 
frameworks. It also traces and considers the less prominent but 
emergent principle of the exclusivity of the two theories. Part III 
discusses how the Court diverged from these central principles to 
varying degrees in Young, Abercrombie & Fitch, and Inclusive 
Communities. This Part also considers the failed effort of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), soon after 
these decisions, to use Young as support for breaking the dichoto-
my of theories in EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions.'6 
Catastrophe Management Solutions serves as an exemplar of why 
the discrete and exclusive theories fail to effectively address some 
types of workplace discrimination. Part IV explains the disorder 
that prevails beneath the surface in the statutes, theories, and 
proof frameworks that constitute the quietly eroding core of em-
14. See, e.g., Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1055, 
1103-07 (2017) (arguing for recognition of a theory of reckless discrimination) [hereinafter 
Bornstein, Reckless]; Richard Thomas Ford, Bias in the Air: Rethinking Employment Dis-
crimination Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1381, 1384 (2014) (proposing that employment discrim-
ination law should shift in focus from causation and intent to a focus on employers' duty of 
care to avoid perpetuating segregation and hierarchy); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, 
Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 967-72 (1993) (positing that much of the 
existing regime of employment discrimination law is negligence-based and arguing for a 
general theory of negligent discrimination); Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-
Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1433-39 (2009) (arguing for a reconceptualized theory of discrimina-
tion based on membership causation). 
15. Sperino, supra note 5, at 1816 (positing that the dichotomy model permits easy 
dismissal of claims based on structural discrimination, unconscious bias, and negligence, 
whereas a model viewing discrimination as a spectrum permits a more open inquiry). 
16. 852 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2016), reh'g denied, 876 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2017). 
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ployment discrimination law. Part IV also considers the Court's 
capacity for creativity and innovation that implicitly undermines 
the failing core of employment discrimination law. Part V de-
scribes the improved doctrine that could emanate from Young, 
Abercrombie & Fitch, and other decisions. The Court could reject 
the dichotomy of theories and proof structures. In its place, the 
Court could permit the blending of principles across theories, 
could eschew cabining evidence as relevant and probative under 
one theory, and could expressly recognize a variety of theories or 
causes of action. It also could rectify the proof structure conun-
drum for intentional discrimination claims under Title VII by 
eliminating the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis 7 and pro-
claim that all such claims be analyzed under the "motivating fac-
tor" standard of causation and mixed-motives analysis added to 
Title VII by the Civil Rights Act of 1991." Such Court-developed 
doctrine could not completely abrogate the dichotomy of theories 
because some aspects are memorialized in the statutes. Further-
more, the Court could not produce complete symmetry across the 
statutes because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII to 
codify and slightly modify existing case law in ways that it did not 
amend the Age Discrimination in Employment Act or the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act.' 9 Moreover, there are other differences 
in statutory language among the three laws that suggest or re-
quire distinctions. To realize fully this less rigid and ritualistic 
approach to analysis of employment discrimination claims and 
achieve harmonization across the statutes, it will be necessary for 
Congress to amend the statues to remove some of the current pro-
visions that ensconce the old core based on distinctiveness, separa-
tion, and exclusivity of theories as well as the dichotomy of dis-
parate treatment proof structures. 
17. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973). 
18. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C). Two of the most significant codifications were 
the insertion of mixed-motives and disparate-impact frameworks in Title VII. In so amend-
ing Title VII, Congress was adopting, with modifications, the mixed-motives proof struc-
ture articulated by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 
(1989), and adjusting (or restoring to prior understanding) the disparate-impact framework 
discussed by the Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. u. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). That 
Congress did not similarly amend the ADEA and the ADA would later result in the Court's 
interpretation of these changes as being inapplicable to the ADEA. See Gross v. FBL Fin. 
Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (holding the mixed-motives framework of the 1991 Act 
inapplicable to the ADEA); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (announcing a 
disparate impact framework different from that installed in Title VII by the 1991 Act). 
19. See infra Part IV.A. 
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II. THE CORE OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: DICHOTOMY 
AND EXCLUSIVITY 
Three laws form the principal statutory bases of employment 
discrimination law2 0 : Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title 
VII),2 ' the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),2 2 and 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 2 3 The key language of 
each of the two earliest laws, Title VII and the ADEA, declares it 
an "unlawful employment practice" for an employer "to fail or re-
fuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrim-
inate against" an employee regarding terms and conditions of em-
ployment "because of . . . [the protected characteristic] ."24 "Dis-
criminate," which serves as the catchall term to cover other ad-
verse employment actions, has become the salient term to identify 
this area of the law. Title VII and the ADEA do not include a defi-
nition of discrimination.2 5 At the time of the enactment of Title 
VII, discrimination in common parlance26 would have been under-
stood to mean "distinguish[ing] unjustly."2 7 The wording of the 
ADA prohibition is different, declaring that "[n]o covered entity 
shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of 
20. Congress enacted the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act in 2008. Pub. L. 
No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29 & 42 
U.S.C.). The volume of charges filed under this Act has been small, and there are few report-
ed cases discussing this Act. Regarding the number of charges filed, see Charge Statistics 
(Charges filed with the EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2016, U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM'N 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm [https://perma.cc/UQD6-R58N]. 
21. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 66 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e-15 (2012)). Race discrimination claims also can be asserted under 
section 1981. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012). The analysis of race claims under section 1981 is not 
separate from or different than the analysis of such claims under Title VII. See Patterson 
v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended 
Title VII and created a freestanding section 1981a, which provides for damages and jury 
trials in Title VII intentional discrimination cases for which damages are not available 
under section 1981. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2012)). 
22. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2012)). 
23. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2012)). 
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012). In a minor variation in lan-
guage, the ADEA provision states that "[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer" rather than 
declaring as Title VII does that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice." In another 
inconsequential variation, the ADEA omits the word "to" before "discriminate." 
25. Michael Evan Gold, Disparate Impact is Not Unconstitutional, 16 TEX. J. 
C.L. & C.R. 171, 175 (2011). 
26. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) ("In the absence of ... a definition, we 
construe a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning."). 
27. Gold, supra note 25, at 176. 
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disability."2 8 The ADA then lists seven acts that constitute such 
discrimination.29 Thus, the ADA does define discrimination in a 
way that Title VII and the ADEA do not, and this may result in 
the Court or courts interpreting the statute as creating more than 
two theories of recovery or causes of action under the ADA. 
Given the lean prohibitory language of Title VII and the ADEA, 
the courts developed through case law the concepts and principles 
for proving and analyzing claims. Working from two separate 
statutory provisions in Title VII, 30 the Court developed two princi-
pal theories of discrimination-disparate treatment (intentional 
discrimination) 3' and disparate impact (unintentional discrimina-
tion). 32 Under individual disparate treatment, the Supreme Court 
developed two proof structures for proving and analyzing inten-
tional discrimination: the pretext framework first announced in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green33 and the mixed-motives 
framework articulated by the Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins, 34 which was revised and codified by Congress, at least for Ti-
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012). The original language in the ADA, as enacted in 1990, 
prohibited discrimination "because of the disability of such individual." The language was 
changed by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 5, 122 Stat. 3553, 3557. 
29. Id. § 12112(b). 
30. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of em-
ployment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (2012). 
31. The Court also recognized distinctions between individual and systemic disparate 
treatment, with a separate proof framework for systemic. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
32. The Court has declared that disparate treatment is manifested in § 703(a)(1), 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and disparate impact is embodied in § 703(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(2). See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 235 (2005); see also Sperino, supra note 
5, at 1789. It is now accepted that the Court grounded disparate impact in § 703(a)(2) when 
it recognized the theory in Griggs u. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Court did 
not expressly state that, however, until its decision eleven years after Griggs in Connecti-
cut u. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448 (1982). See Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at 
the Birth, Death, and Resurrection of the Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431, 454 (2005). 
33. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
34. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
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tie VII, 3 5 in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.36 This dichotomy of proof 
structures is of great importance in employment discrimination law 
because the overwhelming majority of claims are individual disparate 
treatment claims.37 Because the proof structures are used to analyze 
claims and decide dispositive motions in the trial courts, this dichot-
omy has immense practical significance. The Court set forth the dis-
parate impact theory and a rough version of the affiliated proof 
framework in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 3 8 and Congress revised and 
codified that framework for Title VII, but not the ADEA and the 
ADA, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.39 
The core of employment discrimination law, the basis for deciding 
all claims, has been two separate subsections of the discrimination 
statutes yielding two separate theories of discrimination for which 
the Court and Congress developed associated distinct proof frame-
works. 4 0 Every employment discrimination claim is categorized as 
35. The Court explained that the mixed-motives framework does not apply under the 
ADEA in Gross v. FBL Financial Services Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009). The Court later 
held that mixed motives is not applicable under the antiretaliation provision of Title VII in 
University of Texas Southwest Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013). It 
probably does not apply under the ADA, but the Supreme Court has not decided the issue, 
and there is a split of authority on the issue. See Gentry v. E. W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 
816 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 2016) (joining Sixth and Seventh Circuits in applying but-for 
causation); Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 321 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding 
mixed-motives analysis is not applicable to the ADA based on Gross); Serwatka v. Rockwell 
Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 963-64 (7th Cir. 2010) (same). But see Hoffman v. Baylor 
Health Care Sys., 597 F. App'x 231, 237 (5th Cir. Jan. 6, 2015) (stating that standard of 
causation under the ADA is "motivating factor"), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 45 (2015); Siring v. 
Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ. 977 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063 (D. Or. 2013) (same). 
36. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The two parts of the mixed-motives analysis are at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012) ("motivating factor") and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012) 
(same-decision defense). 
37. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 989 (1991) (stating that only 101 of 7,613 
employment discrimination claims in 1989 alleged disparate impact); Linda Hamilton 
Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action, 86 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1251, 1302 (1998) ("by the end of the [1980s] the overwhelming majority of Title 
VII suits involved individual claims of disparate treatment discrimination brought by indi-
vidual private litigants"); Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrim-
ination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 198 (2009) (stating that "the vast majority of 
discrimination claims in federal court" are disparate treatment cases). It seems likely that 
the predominance of disparate treatment claims has increased since the enactment of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, which made compensatory and punitive damages and jury trials 
available in intentional discrimination, but not disparate impact, cases. 
38. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
39. The framework is at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012). The Supreme Court explained 
that the statutory version of the disparate impact framework does not apply to the ADEA 
in Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005). 
40. See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake, The Shifting Sands of Employment Discrimination: 
From Unjustified Impact to Disparate Treatment in Pregnancy and Pay, 105 GEo. L.J. 559, 
568-69 (2017) (stating that "the separation of disparate treatment from disparate impact is 
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disparate treatment or disparate impact, and then the evidence can 
be funneled into a proof structure affiliated with that theory. In this 
design, theories and proof frameworks must be kept distinct and pro-
liferation of theories must be avoided. As Professor Deborah L. Brake 
depicts it, "the picture that emerges reveals an area of law bound by 
rigid proof frameworks-in which the sorting of evidence into dis-
crete categories and shifting burdens of proof take center stage-and 
a sharp dichotomy separating disparate treatment and disparate im-
pact claims."41 Over the years, there have been increasing signs that 
the Supreme Court is having difficulty keeping discrimination claims 
tethered to this core. 
A. Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact: The Dichotomy of 
Theories 
Today, it is axiomatic that there are two principal theories of em-
ployment discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA-disparate 
treatment and disparate impact. 4 2 Failure to make reasonable ac-
commodation was thought by most courts 43 and scholars 44 to be a 
separate theory before Abercrombie & Fitch, but it was limited to re-
ligion, disability, 4 5 and perhaps pregnancy. 46 The exclusivity and dis-
tinctiveness of the theories has been so sacrosanct, 4 7 even if not uni-
the foundation on which employment discrimination doctrine is built"); Sperino, supra note 
5, at 1794 (stating that the dichotomy of theories, emanating from separate statutory sec-
tions, with their separate proof structures, has "huge implications for both the theory and 
the practice of federal discrimination law"). 
41. See, e.g., Brake, supra note 40, at 562. 
42. Id. at 560; Sperino, supra note 5, at 1790; Zatz, supra note 14, at 1361. 
43. See, e.g., Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 2003); Wilson v. U.S. W. 
Commc'ns, 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995). 
44. Roberto L. Corrada, Toward an Integrated Disparate Treatment and Accommoda-
tion Framework for Title VII Religion Cases, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1411, 1411 (2009); Oppen-
heimer, supra note 14, at 936 (positing that Court in describing all employment discrimi-
nation cases as coming within disparate treatment or disparate impact failed to account for 
a third theory-failure to accommodate); Zatz, supra note 14, at 1361 (referring to nonac-
commodation as "another recognized theory of discrimination"). 
45. Presumably, failure to reasonably accommodate is a separate theory under the 
ADA, but Abercrombie & Fitch may call that presumption into question. The statutory 
provision of Title VII interpreted by the Court in Abercrombie & Fitch presents a less com-
pelling case for a separate theory than the differently situated ADA provision. Whether 
failure to reasonably accommodate is a separate theory under the ADA is considered supra 
note 2 and infra note 305. 
46. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015) (permitting a plaintiff to 
assert a failure-to-accommodate pregnancy claim within the McDonnell Douglas pretext 
framework). 
47. Where do harassment and stereotyping fit? Some commentators categorize them, 
and the Court would seem to agree, as subsets of disparate treatment. See, e.g., Bornstein, 
Reckless, supra note 14, at 1061, 1080 (referring to harassment and nonaccommodation as 
additional theories and then sub-types of disparate treatment). One of the principal argu-
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versally applauded, 4 8 that it seems that Congress must have declared 
the theories when it enacted Title VII or the Court must have imme-
diately gleaned them from the statute in its early interpretations of 
Title VII. In reality, however, Congress did not declare those theories 
in Title VII, and the Court did not definitively discover them in its 
earliest encounters with the statute. A short history in support of 
this point is in order because it goes some way toward undermining 
the inviolability of this dichotomy of theories. Their pedigree is not as 
closely linked to the statutes as it has come to be understood. 
To begin with, neither the term "disparate treatment" nor "dis-
parate impact" appeared in Title VII when it was enacted in 1964.49 
Thus, the Supreme Court must have gleaned those theories, as a 
matter of interpretation, from the statutory language. While that is 
true, the theories did not spring up fully developed or even named in 
the earliest Court decisions. As Professor Sandra Sperino describes 
it, the emergence of this dichotomy was "quite accidental."5 0 The Su-
preme Court's most quoted articulation of the two theories of discrim-
ination appears in a footnote in International Brotherhood of Team-
sters v. United States:5 1 
"Disparate treatment" such as is alleged in the present case is 
the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer 
simply treats some people less favorably than others because of 
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discrimi-
natory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be in-
ferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment. . . . Undoubt-
edly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had 
in mind when it enacted Title VII.... 
ments of this Article is that harassment, stereotyping, nonaccommodation, and other types 
of claims should be recognized as theories of discrimination and not categorized as subsets 
of disparate treatment. Moreover, the decision to classify them as subsets of disparate 
treatment, rather than freestanding theories, restricts the development and flexibility of 
employment discrimination law. See Sperino, supra note 5, at 1816. 
48. See, e.g., Sperino, supra note 5, at 1802; Zatz, supra note 14, at 1361. 
49. See, e.g., Elaine W. Shoben, Employee Recruitment by Design or Default: Uncer-
tainty under Title VII, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 891, 892 n.5 (1986) (noting that neither term is 
used in Title VII). Neither term was used in the congressional committee report. H.R. REP. 
No. 88-914 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391. "Disparate treatment" is still ab-
sent in the statutes, but the term "disparate impact" now does appear. In the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, Congress amended Title VII expressly to provide for a disparate impact 
framework. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012). The 1991 Act also enacted a freestanding 
section 1981a, which provides for compensatory and punitive damages in cases of "unlaw-
ful intentional discrimination," which the statute explains is "not an employment practice 
that is unlawful because of its disparate impact." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(1)(2) (2012). 
50. Sperino, supra note 5, at 1815. 
51. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
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. . . Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from 
claims that stress "disparate impact." The latter involve employ-
ment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of dif-
ferent groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than 
another and cannot be justified by business necessity. . . . Proof of 
discriminatory motive, we have held, is not required under a dis-
parate-impact theory. . . . Either theory may, of course, be applied 
to a particular set of facts.5 2 
Although the fact seems lost in antiquity, before Teamsters, the 
Supreme Court had not used the terms "disparate treatment" and 
"disparate impact" to name the theories of discrimination. 53 Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co. 54 is the origin of disparate impact in Supreme Court 
case law, and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green55 may be said to be 
the genesis of disparate treatment in the Court's case law.5 6 While 
Griggs is the opinion that adopted the disparate impact theory and 
McDonnell Douglas announced a proof structure to be used under 
disparate treatment, neither case so labeled the theories. 
McDonnell Douglas was the Court's third encounter with Title 
VII.57 In that decision, the Court began drawing the lines of demarca-
tion between the two unnamed theories. The Eighth Circuit, in the 
opinion below, relied heavily on the Griggs decision to fashion its 
analysis of the intentional discrimination claim. The Supreme Court 
in McDonnell Douglas, however, explained that relying on Griggs 
was incorrect because that case differed from McDonnell Douglas in 
important respects. While Griggs involved the employer's use of a 
facially neutral test and criterion that disproportionately excluded 
African Americans, McDonnell Douglas involved a disagreement 
about the reason why the employer did not rehire the plaintiff, or as 
the Court put it, this plaintiff "appear[ed] in different clothing" than 
52. Id. at 335-36 n.15 (citations omitted). 
53. Barbara Lindemann Schlei and Paul Grossman used these labels for the theories 
in the first edition of their influential treatise. Gold, supra note 25, at 173 & 173 n.12 (cit-
ing BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 
1-12 (1976)). 
54. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
55. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
56. Although Congress did not use the term "disparate treatment" in the statute, 
there was no disagreement that Congress's principal objective was to prohibit intentional 
discrimination. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15. According to Professor Belton, "[t]here 
is no real dispute that at the time Congress enacted Title VII, it intended to prohibit bla-
tant, overt, or intentional racially discriminatory employment practices in the private sec-
tor. The terms 'to discriminate,' 'intended,' and 'intentionally' are used repeatedly through-
out the Act." Belton, supra note 32, at 438. 
57. The first was Phillips v. Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. 542 (1971), and the second was 
Griggs in 1971. 
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did the plaintiff in Griggs.5 8 By the time of the Teamsters decision in 
1977, the Court had crystalized the two theories of discrimination. 
The concept of employment discrimination did not spring into ex-
istence with the enactment of Title VII. Before Griggs and the 
Court's other early efforts to define discrimination, there were views 
about what types of employment discrimination were or might be 
prohibited by Title VII. Before the enactment of Title VII, more than 
twenty-five states and Puerto Rico had enacted fair employment 
practice laws prohibiting employment discrimination based on race.5 9 
Still, as Professor Alfred Blumrosen describes it, the definition and 
contours of discrimination had not been firmly established by 1965, 
the effective date of Title VII.6 0 Blumrosen identified three concepts 
about the nature of employment discrimination that had emerged in 
the law and literature.6 ' The first was acts causing economic harm in 
which the actor is motivated by animus toward the group of which 
the victim is a member, for which the common law parallels were 
willful and wanton misconduct and mens rea in criminal law. 62 The 
second was economic harm caused by an actor treating members of 
one group less favorably than similarly situated members of another 
group, with negligence and equal protection constitutional cases serv-
ing as its common law parallels. 63 The third was conduct that has an 
adverse effect on members of one group compared to members of an-
other group, for which res ipsa loquitur, interference with advanta-
58. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 806. 
59. Sanford Jay Rosen, The Law and Racial Discrimination in Employment, 53 CAL. L. 
REV. 729, 775-76 (1965). New York was the first state to pass such a law in 1945. Id. at 775. 
60. Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the 
Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 66 (1972). Professor Blum-
rosen was the Chief of Conciliations for the EEOC from 1965 to 1967 and was instrumental 
in developing the EEOC's positions in early litigation. He identifies as the reason for the 
lack of development that state civil rights agencies focused their efforts on "voluntary com-
pliance" and did not process many cases through state agency procedures and hearings. Id. 
at 66; see also Rosen, supra note 59, at 778, 780 (observing that state and local FEP agen-
cies relied heavily on conciliation and voluntary compliance). As a result of this "nonlitiga-
tion approach" by state agencies, there were few state court opinions grappling with the 
meaning of discrimination. Blumrosen, supra, at 66. 
61. Blumrosen, supra note 60, at 67. 
62. Id. Professor Arthur Bonfield, another commentator, writing soon after the en-
actment of Title VII, considered the prohibitory language of Title VII, the Model Act of the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the state fair employ-
ment practice laws. See generally Arthur E. Bonfield, Substance of American Fair Em-
ployment Practices Legislation I Employers, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 907 (1967). He noted that 
all of the statutes' general omnibus prohibition clauses (§703(a) in Title VII) prohibited 
employment practices only when coupled with a certain state of mind. Id. at 955-56. How-
ever, Bonfield also observed that section 703(a)(2) and analogous state fair employment 
practice provisions prohibit segregation and classification. Id. at 965-66. 
63. Blumrosen, supra note 60, at 67. 
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geous relations, and strict liability were the common law analogues.6 4 
Considering these early concepts or theories of discrimination and 
their purported common law analogues, we can see that disparate 
treatment and disparate impact have come to include them, but have 
narrowed them to two and have not retained all of the common law 
analogues. It seems that disparate treatment is comprised of the first 
two concepts identified by Blumrosen, but negligence was dropped as 
an analogue for unequal treatment, and the analogue of intentional 
torts was adopted for the two concepts that were folded into disparate 
treatment. The third version has come to be labeled disparate im-
pact, although its common law analogues are debatable. 
Beginning with McDonnell Douglas, the Court has, in several 
opinions, labored to maintain lines of demarcation between disparate 
treatment and disparate impact.6 5 In Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,6 6 
the Court stated, "[w]e long have distinguished between 'disparate 
treatment' and 'disparate impact' theories of employment discrimina-
tion."6 7 The plaintiff in Hazen Paper Co. sued his employer for viola-
tions of both the ADEA and the Employee Retirement Income Securi-
ty Act of 19746 for terminating his employment only weeks before his 
pension vested.6 9 The Court was concerned that the court of appeals, 
in affirming a judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the age discrimi-
nation claim, had relied heavily on evidence indicating the employer's 
purpose was to prevent the pension from vesting. However, pension 
vesting is based on years of service, and that is a distinct concept 
from age.7 0 As the Court expressed it, firing the plaintiff because he 
had over nine years of service and his pension was about to vest 
would not be tantamount to firing him because of his age.7 ' Explain-
ing that disparate treatment was the "essence of what Congress 
sought to prohibit in the ADEA,"7 2 the Court alerted lower courts to 
the possibility that the disparate impact theory of discrimination 
64. Id. 
65. See Brake, supra note 40, at 564-69 (tracing this theme through Court decisions). 
Despite the Court's escalating insistence on the separation of the two theories, it endeav-
ored, in some earlier opinions, to make the disparate impact proof structure parallel the 
McDonnell Douglas disparate treatment structure. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 
U.S. 405, 426 (1975) (explaining the parallels between the first two stages of the proof 
structures). 
66. 507 U.S. 604 (1993). 
67. Id. at 609. 
68. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2012). 
69. Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 606-07. 
70. Id. at 611-12. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 610. 
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might not apply to the ADEA. 7 3 However, this possibility was later 
dispelled by the Court in Smith v. City of Jackson.7 4 The main thrust 
of the Court's Hazen Paper Co. opinion is that the evidence relied up-
on by the court of appeals may establish a disparate impact claim, 
which the Court suggested may not be actionable under the ADEA, 
and it may or may not support a disparate treatment claim.7 5 The 
Court reversed and remanded for clarification. 
The Supreme Court also engaged in boundary maintenance be-
tween theories in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez.7 6 The plaintiff sued his 
employer for disparate treatment discrimination under the ADA. The 
employee had been employed with Raytheon and had been given the 
option to resign in lieu of termination after testing positive for drug 
(cocaine) use. The reason stated for separation from employment in 
his file was "discharge for personal conduct (quit in lieu of dis-
charge)."7 7 Over two years later, plaintiff applied for rehire and pro-
vided letters of reference regarding his rehabilitation. The person 
who reviewed plaintiffs application rejected it based on Raytheon's 
purported policy of not rehiring employees who were terminated for 
workplace misconduct. She said that she did not know of plaintiffs 
drug use issues when she made the decision not to rehire.7 8 Plaintiff 
sued under the disparate treatment theory, arguing that the employ-
er refused to rehire him because of his record of past drug addiction 
or because it regarded him as a drug addict.79 The district court, court 
of appeals, and Supreme Court all found that plaintiffs claim sound-
ed in disparate impact, not disparate treatment, and he had failed to 
plead or raise disparate impact in a timely manner.8 However, in 
analyzing the plaintiffs disparate treatment claim under the 
McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis, the court of appeals rejected the 
employer's proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason at stage 
two of the analysis. As the Supreme Court put it, "the [c]ourt of 
[a]ppeals held that a neutral no-rehire policy could never suffice in a 
case where the employee was terminated for illegal drug use, because 
73. See, e.g., EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. de-
nied, 115 S. Ct. 2577 (1995); Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996). 
74. 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
75. Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 609-10. The Court would display a more open ap-
proach to what disparate impact-type evidence might prove in Young v. United Parcel Ser-
vice, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). The Court held that intent might be inferred from evi-
dence of disparate impact, notwithstanding the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason. For a detailed discussion of Young, see infra Part III.A. 
76. 540 U.S. 44 (2003). 
77. Id. at 47. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 49. 
80. Id. 
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such a policy has a disparate impact on recovering drug addicts."' 
The Court explained that the appellate court's error was conflating 
the proof frameworks of the two distinct theories of discrimination." 
Beyond its rejection of the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason, the appellate court diverged completely from the disparate 
treatment pretext analysis and discussed that the neutral no-rehire 
policy would screen out applicants with a record of drug addiction 
and that the employer had offered no business necessity defense for 
maintaining the policy. 8 3 Business necessity, however, is a statutory 
defense to disparate impact claims. 8 4 The Court explained that "such 
an analysis is inapplicable to a disparate-treatment claim."8 5 Citing 
and quoting from Teamsters and Hazen Paper Co., the Court declared 
that "[t]his Court has consistently recognized a distinction between 
claims of discrimination based on disparate treatment and claims of 
discrimination based on disparate impact." 
Although the Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes8 7 
is most often thought of for the procedural ramifications of its rejec-
tion of class certification in sex discrimination claims against Wal-
Mart, the majority opinion also reveals the Court once again laboring 
to maintain the boundaries between disparate treatment and dispar-
ate impact. The plaintiffs asserted a systemic disparate treatment 
theory that implicated both impact and treatment. According to the 
Court, the plaintiffs claimed that Wal-Mart gave local managers dis-
cretion over pay and promotions that they exercised disproportion-
ately in favor of men, thus producing a disparate impact on female 
employees." The next step in the plaintiffs' claim was that Wal-Mart 
was aware of the impact, and its refusal to restrict the managers' dis-
cretion constituted disparate treatment." The Court's majority opin-
ion noted that the issue of commonality on class certification "neces-
sarily overlaps with respondents' merits contention that Wal-Mart 
engages in a pattern or practice of discrimination."9 0 The Court noted 
that commonality might be satisfied if either the employer used a 
biased testing procedure or the employer operated under a general 
81. Id. at 51. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 54. 
84. Id. (referring to "factors that pertain to disparate-impact claims but not disparate-
treatment claims"). 
85. Id. at 55. 
86. Id. at 52. 
87. 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
88. Id. at 343-44. 
89. Id. at 345. 
90. Id. at 352. 
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policy of discrimination.9' The Court observed that the case did not 
involve a test, so it turned to the possibility of a general policy of dis-
crimination and found the case bereft of evidence of that feature as 
well.9 2 The Court rejected the plaintiffs' social framework evidence 
because their expert could not specify how regularly stereotypes 
played a meaningful role in Wal-Mart's employment decisions. 9 3 The 
Court majority recognized that giving discretion to lower-level super-
visors could, in an appropriate case, be the basis for a disparate im-
pact claim. 9 4 However, the Court was troubled that what the plain-
tiffs were arguing was that the systemic disparate treatment and the 
commonality had to come from what the Court characterized as Wal-
Mart's "policy against having uniform employment practices."9 5 
It is hard to untangle the Court's misgivings in Wal-Mart regard-
ing the commonality requirement in class certification9 6 from its mer-
its-based concerns about the theories of discrimination. It does seem, 
however, that the Court was very uncomfortable with the plaintiffs' 
theory that the managers' exercise of discretion resulted in an impact 
that Wal-Mart was aware of but failed to correct, resulting in system-
ic disparate treatment. Professor Richard Thompson Ford explained 
the plaintiffs' theory as Wal-Mart's having not "taken sufficient care 
to prevent" sex discrimination.9 7 The case is reminiscent of an earlier 
case, Watson v. Fort Worth Ban & Trust,9 8 in which the Court reluc-
tantly held that disparate impact could be applied to subjective em-
ployment practices.9 9 Thus, the Court's discomfort with the plaintiffs' 
substantive theory of discrimination in Wal-Mart seemed to be rooted 
in the notion that it did not fit well within either disparate treatment 
or disparate impact and seemed to involve some blending of theories. 
91. Id. at 353. 
92. Id. at 355. 
93. Id. at 356-57. Professor Bornstein discusses the decision as significantly limiting 
the tools for redressing implicit bias discrimination. Stephanie Bornstein, Unifying Anti-
discrimination Through Stereotype Theory, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 919, 920-21 (2016) 
[hereinafter Bornstein, Unifying]. 
94. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 355. 
95. Id. 
96. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
97. Ford, supra note 14, at 1387. 
98. 487 U.S. 977 (1988). Watson, like Wal-Mart, was a case that sought to extend dis-
crimination theory by expanding the applicability of disparate impact. Professor Susan 
Sturm views Watson as adopting a structural approach to remedying discrimination. Susan 
Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 458, 484-89 (2001). However, plaintiffs have not fared well in subsequent 
cases in which they attacked subjective practices using disparate impact. Samuel Ba-
genstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 
22-23 (2006). 
99. Watson, 487 U.S. at 999. 
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In yet another decision, in United Automobile Workers v. Johnson 
Controls, Inc., the Court adhered to separation of disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact.' In the Seventh Circuit opinion, the 
court had found that Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy could 
be defended successfully under business necessity.' The Supreme 
Court reversed, explaining that business necessity is a defense for a 
disparate impact claim, but the claim against Johnson Controls was 
a disparate treatment claim, to which the more stringent defense of 
bona fide occupational qualification 0 2 applies.1 0 3 Thus, the defenses 
associated with each theory must be kept distinct.10 4 
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the Court has, in sever-
al opinions, insisted on maintaining the dichotomy of disparate 
treatment and disparate impact. 
B. Pretext and Mixed Motives: The Dichotomy of Individual 
Disparate Treatment Proof Frameworks 
Analysis of discrimination claims is all about distinction and cate-
gorization-maintenance of dichotomies. If a claim is categorized by a 
court as individual disparate treatment'0 5 rather than disparate im-
pact, the appropriate proof framework must be selected and applied 
to evaluate the claim. After the development of the McDonnell Doug-
las pretext structure in 1973 and the Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins1 
mixed-motives structure in 1989, the lower courts adopted a basis for 
deciding which proof framework applied to a given disparate treat-
ment claim. If a claim involved merely circumstantial evidence of dis-
crimination, the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework applied, and 
if a claim included direct evidence, then the mixed-motives analysis 
applied.' 0 7 The type-of-evidence demarcation was taken from Justice 
100. United Auto. Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
101. Id. at 193. 
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2012). 
103. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 200-01. 
104. In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress codified this result in § 703(k)(2), which 
states, "[a] demonstration that an employment practice is required by business necessity 
may not be used as a defense against a claim of intentional discrimination under this sub-
chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2) (2012). 
105. Systemic disparate treatment claims are evaluated under a less rigid framework 
established in International Brotherhood of Teamsters u. United States, 431 U.S. 324 
(1977). Under that structure, a plaintiff proves that intentional discrimination is the em-
ployer's standard operating procedure, typically by statistical and anecdotal testimony. 
106. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
107. See generally Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing: Refining the Price Waterhouse 
Standard and Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 878-82 
(2004); Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, 
Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1910 (2004). 
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O'Connor's concurrence in Price Waterhouse.08 Although the stand-
ard was criticized because of the amorphous distinction between cir-
cumstantial and direct evidence,' 9 there was at least a precedential 
basis of distinction. In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, the Supreme 
Court abrogated the distinction."o The Court held that a plaintiff as-
serting a Title VII individual disparate treatment claim is not re-
quired to present direct evidence in order to be entitled to a "motivat-
ing factor""' jury instruction." 2 The Court reasoned that when Con-
gress codified a modified version of mixed motives in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 in sections 703(m) and 706(g)(2)(B), Congress said noth-
ing of direct evidence.11 3 The Desert Palace decision raised the ques-
tion of whether the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework survived 
the decision." 4 If it did, what was the new line of demarcation be-
tween the two frameworks? 
Since Desert Palace, courts have struggled with the issue of what 
to do with the two frameworks in the absence of any direction re-
garding under what circumstances to apply each." 5 When the Fifth 
Circuit, in Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc.," took on the task of ad-
dressing the question Desert Palace left open, it merged the pretext 
and mixed-motives analyses into what it termed the "modified 
McDonnell Douglas approach."" 7 This approach retained the three 
stages of the pretext analysis, although they seemed perfunctory 
when the court grafted the "motivating factor" standard of mixed 
motives onto the third stage as an alternative to pretext."8 
108. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 270-71 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
109. See, e.g., Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 852-53 (9th Cir. 2002) (de-
scribing the categories developed by First Circuit Judge Selya), aff'd, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
110. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012). 
112. Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 101-02. 
113. Id. at 98-99. 
114. See, e.g., Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 990-93 (D. Minn. 
2003); Brake, supra note 40, at 566; Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating 
Distinctions Among Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 102-03 
(2004); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. 
L. REV. 741, 765-66 (2005); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, 'Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!" An Essay 
on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case 
After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a "Mixed-Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 76 
(2003); Zimmer, supra note 107, at 1929-32. 
115. For an opinion summarizing the positions of the various circuits, see White v. Bax-
ter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 398-99 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1235 
(2009) (describing the holdings of various circuit courts with respect to the appropriate 
proof structures for disparate treatment claims after Desert Palace); see also Sullivan, su-
pra note 37, at 210 n.81 (collecting court decisions and articles). 
116. 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004). 
117. Id. at 312. 
118. Id. 
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The Supreme Court appears to have reasserted the vitality of the 
McDonnell Douglas pretext framework by invoking it in Young v. 
United Parcel Service, Inc."' In Young, the Court used the pretext 
structure to fashion an unusual hybrid disparate treatment-
disparate impact analysis to address a pregnancy discrimination 
claim based on failure to accommodate.o20 However, the emasculated 
version of the analysis fashioned in Young and the Court's use of mo-
tivating factor in Abercrombie & Fitch, along with its statements 
about motivating factor relaxing the Title VII standard of causation, 
should demonstrate that McDonnell Douglas cannot be maintained 
as a parallel-proof framework. It may be retained as an analytical 
tool, but it should be subordinate to the one statutory proof frame-
work. I argue below that it is a mistake to retain it as an analytical 
tool.' 2
Assuming both frameworks survived Desert Palace, fifteen years 
later neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has declared a basis 
for distinction. 2 2 The Court should have abandoned the dichotomy of 
individual disparate treatment proof structures years ago. 
C. Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact: Nonproliferation of 
Theories 
The Court, in its efforts to maintain the distinctions between dis-
parate treatment and disparate impact, also has implied that those 
are the only theories of discrimination under Title VII.1 2 3 However, it 
was not clear that failure to make reasonable accommodations was 
precluded as a third theory, applicable to at least religion.12 4 While 
the theme of an exclusive dichotomy of theories has been implicit in 
the Court's decisions over the years, the Court in Abercrom-
bie & Fitch expressly declared that disparate treatment and dispar-
ate impact "are the only causes of action under Title VII,"'2 5 thus lay-
ing to rest the idea that nonaccommodation of religion is a distinct 
119. 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1353-54 (2015). 
120. See infra Part III.A. 
121. See infra Part V.B.III. 
122. See, e.g., Brake, supra note 40, at 566 (stating that "determining which of these 
two proof frameworks applies in any given Title VII individual disparate treatment case, 
and discerning how the two models interrelate, remains a muddled mess"). 
123. See, e.g., Sperino, supra note 5, at 1791; Zatz, supra note 14, at 1368-69. 
124. See supra notes 43 & 44 (stating that courts and commentators considered nonac-
commodation to be a separate theory of religious discrimination). 
125. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015). 
' 
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theory of discrimination or cause of action under Title VII1 26-or that 
anything else could be. Is this declaration of restriction of theories 
consequential to the ongoing development of employment discrimina-
tion doctrine? I think it is, and I will explore why this is troubling. 
First, it is not necessarily an accurate description of existing law. 2 7 
Second, the restriction seems likely to limit the malleability of the 
law to address much of the discrimination occurring in modern work-
places. 2 
Beyond the Court's decisions, there is no statutory language in the 
1964 Act that restricts Title VII to the development of two theories of 
discrimination. There is, however, statutory language from the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 that suggests there are only two general theories. 
Section 1981a makes jury trials and compensatory and punitive 
damages available in cases of "unlawful intentional discrimination," 
(or disparate treatment cases).'2 9 Accordingly, cases involving an em-
ployment practice that is "unlawful because of its disparate im-
pact"1 30 are not eligible for either jury trials or damages. Thus, the 
classification of a claim as either treatment or impact has significant 
practical consequences. 
III. THE COURT'S 2015 REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION DECISIONS 
PLUS ONE 
A. Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.: Forcing a 
Nonaccommodation Claim into the McDonnell Douglas Pretext 
Framework and Blending Theories 
Young was an air driver for United Parcel Service (UPS), where 
she had worked since 1999. Air drivers take packages and letters de-
livered by air, load them onto their trucks, and deliver them. UPS 
had a requirement that all drivers must be able to lift and handle 
packages weighing up to seventy pounds and to assist with packages 
weighing up to 150 pounds. When Young became pregnant, she was 
restricted from lifting over twenty pounds for the first twenty weeks 
of her pregnancy and over ten pounds thereafter. UPS informed her 
that she could not work at her driver job as long as she was under the 
lifting restriction. Young unsuccessfully argued to be permitted to 
126. The decision does not necessarily determine the issue under the ADA, in which 
the structure of the statute, delineating nonacccommodation as a form of discrimination, 
supports a separate theory or cause of action. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012). 
127. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
128. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(1)-(2) (2012). 
130. Id. 
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continue in her driver job (because other employees had offered to 
assist her with lifting) or to do a light-duty job temporarily during 
her pregnancy. UPS had made such accommodations for other em-
ployees in three scenarios. First, UPS offered temporary transfers to 
light-duty jobs for workers who suffered on-the-job injuries. Second, 
under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, UPS was re-
quired to give "inside jobs" to drivers who lost their certification by 
the Department of Transportation. Finally, UPS provided reasonable 
accommodations, including some job reassignments, for disabled em-
ployees pursuant to the ADA. After Young's request for accommoda-
tion was denied, she was placed on leave under the Family and Medi-
cal Leave Act, and when that leave expired, she took extended leave 
without pay and lost her group medical coverage.131 
Young filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging sex, 
race, and pregnancy discrimination.1 3 2 In her subsequent lawsuit, she 
asserted claims for sex, race, and disability discrimination.1 3 3 Young 
moved to dismiss voluntarily her race discrimination claim,1 3 4 and the 
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on her 
disability and sex discrimination claims.1 3 5 Regarding the sex discrim-
ination claims, the district court granted summary judgment, reason-
ing that Young did not produce direct evidence of discrimination and 
that she could not establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell 
Douglas framework because she did not identify a similarly situated 
comparator who was treated more favorably.1 3 6 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. First, the court rejected the interpre-
tation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act's (PDA) second clause as 
requiring employers to treat pregnant workers the same as similarly 
disabled nonpregnant workers by granting the same accommoda-
tions. The Fourth Circuit characterized that interpretation of the 
PDA as creating an impermissible "most favored nation" 37 status for 
pregnant employees.1 3 8 The court refused to adopt a broad reading of 
the second clause, which would create a cause of action separate and 
distinct from a sex discrimination claim under section 703(a).1 3 9 Sec-
ond, the Fourth Circuit rejected the comments of a supervisor as di-
131. Young v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1346-47 (2015). 
132. Young v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 442 (4th Cir. 2013), rev'd, 135 S. 





137. Id. at 446. 
138. Id. at 446. 
139. Id. at 447. 
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rect evidence of employer discriminatory motive.14 0 Finally, the court 
evaluated Young's claim under the McDonnell Douglas pretext 
framework and held, as the district court had, that Young could not 
establish a prima facie case because she produced no evidence that 
similarly situated employees outside the protected class received 
more favorable treatment.141 The court found that other types of em-
ployees given temporary job reassignments were not appropriate 
comparators.1 4 2 
The Supreme Court's majority opinion considered two interpreta-
tions of the second clause of the PDA.1 4 3 It rejected UPS's reading that 
the second clause does no more than define sex discrimination to in-
clude pregnancy discrimination because the first clause does that, and 
such an interpretation would render the second clause superfluous.1 4 4 
The majority also rejected the broader reading advocated for by Young 
because the majority agreed with the Fourth Circuit that it did not 
think Congress intended, in enacting the PDA, to create pregnancy as 
a "most-favored-nation status."l4 5 Instead, the majority interpreted the 
second clause as permitting a plaintiff to prove a pregnancy discrimi-
nation claim with indirect evidence using the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis.1 46 The majority described the analysis as proceeding in the 
following way. First, the plaintiff would establish a prima facie case by 
proving that she belongs to a protected class, she sought an accommo-
dation, and the employer denied the accommodation, although it did 
accommodate others similarly able or unable to work. Next, the em-
ployer would give a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying 
the accommodation, but that reason normally could not be that ac-
commodating pregnant women was more expensive or less convenient. 
Finally, the plaintiff would prove the employer's reason was pretextu-
al, and a jury question could be created on this issue, by producing suf-
140. Id. at 449. 
141. Id. at 450-51. 
142. Id. 
143. The PDA, as incorporated into Title VII, provides as follows: 
(k) The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not lim-
ited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, in-
cluding receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not 
so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in sec-
tion 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
144. Young v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1352-53 (2015). 
145. Id. at 1349-50. 
146. Id. at 1353-54. 
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ficient evidence that the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son actually imposes a significant burden on pregnant women-a bur-
den which cannot be justified by the given reason and which permits 
an inference of discrimination.1 4 7 
Justice Alito, concurring in the judgment, did not rely on the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis to interpret the second clause, but in-
stead offered an interpretation of the meaning of the second clause 
of the PDA that was also different from either of the two advocated 
for by the parties. According to Justice Alito, an employer violates 
the second clause if it does not have a neutral business reason other 
than expense or inconvenience for treating pregnant employees dif-
ferently than nonpregnant employees who are reassigned.1 4 8 
The dissent, authored by Justice Scalia, argued that the majority 
and the concurrence erred by not accepting UPS's reading of the 
second clause of the PDA as adding nothing but clarity to the first 
clause, which simply defines pregnancy discrimination as a form of 
sex discrimination.1 49 The dissent saw the second clause as capable 
of only the two interpretations argued for by the parties. 5 0 Because 
the majority's application of the McDonnell Douglas pretext analy-
sis requires a court to evaluate the effect of the employer's legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason, the dissent characterized the ap-
proach as "allowing claims that belong under Title VII's disparate-
impact provisions to be brought under its disparate-treatment pro-
visions instead."' 5 ' Justice Scalia's dissent also took the Alito con-
currence to task for its "text-free broadening" of the second clause. 5 2 
Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion expressed agreement with 
Justice Scalia's dissent, which he joined, but also denounced indif-
ference to the plight of pregnant women in the workforce.153 
Kennedy's dissent attempted to minimize the effect of interpreting 
the second clause of the PDA as Justice Scalia did by pointing out 
that there are other laws that may protect and assist working preg-
nant women, including the Family and Medical Leave Act and the 
ADA Amendments Act of 2008.154 The Kennedy dissent agreed with 
the Scalia dissent that the majority's interpretation of the PDA 
risks conflating disparate treatment and disparate impact. Justice 
147. Id. at 1354-55. 
148. Id. at 1359 (Alito, J., concurring). 
149. Id. at 1363 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
150. Id. at 1364. 
151. Id. at 1366. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 1366-67 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
154. Id. at 1367-68. 
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Kennedy added that the majority's analysis "injects unnecessary 
confusion into the accepted burden-shifting framework established 
in McDonnell Douglas."5 5 
B. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.: Reining Claims into 
Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact and Blurring the 
Distinction 
The job applicant who filed a charge was a Muslim woman who 
interviewed for a job with Abercrombie & Fitch while wearing a 
hijab. During the interview, the subject of the applicant's head-
scarf never came up and she never indicated that she wore the 
headscarf for religious reasons or that she would need an accom-
modation to address any conflict between her religious practice 
and Abercrombie's clothing policy.' The assistant manager who 
interviewed her gave her a favorable rating for hiring, but she in-
quired of the store manager whether the headscarf would be con-
sidered prohibited employee dress under the company's "Look Pol-
icy." 57 Receiving no answer, she asked for guidance from the dis-
trict manager, allegedly informing him that she thought the appli-
cant wore the headscarf for religious reasons. 5 8 The district man-
ager advised that the headscarf would violate the policy regardless 
of the reason for which it was worn and instructed the assistant 
manager not to hire her. The EEOC sued Abercrombie for failing 
to make a reasonable accommodation for the applicant's religious 
practice .'5 
The district court granted summary judgment for the EEOC on 
the issue of liability. The court rejected Abercrombie's argument 
that the EEOC failed to establish the notice element of a prima 
facie case because the applicant never informed Abercrombie that 
she wore the headscarf for religious reasons and that she would 
need an accommodation.o6 0 The district court recognized the conflict 
in the circuits on the issue but concluded that the Tenth Circuit most 
likely would hold that the notice requirement would be satisfied if an 
employer had enough information to make it aware of the need for 
155. Id. at 1368. 
156. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 731 F.3d 1106, 1113 (10th Cir. 2013), rev'd, 135 S. 
Ct. 2028 (2015). 
157. Id. at 1114. 
158. Id. at 1114-15. 
159. Id. at 1114. 
160. Id. at 1110-11. 
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accommodation.161 At trial on the issue of damages only, the jury 
awarded the EEOC $20,000 in compensatory damages.6 2 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the summary judgment and 
granted summary judgment in favor of Abercrombie, holding: 
[I]n order to establish the second element of their prima facie case 
under Title VII's religion-accommodation theory, ordinarily plain-
tiffs must establish that they initially informed the employer that 
they engage in a particular practice for religious reasons and that 
they need an accommodation for the practice, due to a conflict be-
tween the practice and the employer's work rules.163 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split in the cir-
cuits as to whether a claim for failure to make reasonable accommoda-
tion requires that the applicant or employee have informed the em-
ployer of the need for an accommodation. The Court held that Title VII 
does not require that the employee give such notice or that the em-
ployer have actual knowledge of an applicant's or employee's need for 
an accommodation. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, 
began with a pronouncement that Title VII recognizes only two "caus-
es of action"-disparate treatment and disparate impact.1 6 4 That 
statement is the majority opinion's tacit rejection of a separate theory 
of discrimination for failure to make a reasonable accommodation. Jus-
tice Thomas in his dissenting opinion more expressly stated this prop-
osition and his agreement with the majority on the point.165 The major-
ity then turned to the principal issue of whether the employer must 
have actual knowledge of the applicant's need for an accommodation. 
The majority answered that question by looking to statutory language. 
Title VII prohibits adverse job actions " 'because of . . . religion.' "166 
The Court then noted that the "because of' standard is relaxed in Title 
VII to "motivating factor." 6 7 Title VII does not, by its terms, impose a 
knowledge requirement, whereas the ADA does impose such a re-
quirement. 6 1 Motive and knowledge are distinct concepts, and the 
statutory language of Title VII requires motive, not knowledge. 6 9 Alt-
hough knowledge may make it easier to infer motive, knowledge is not 
161. Id. at 1114-15. 
162. Id. at 1115. 
163. Id. at 1131. 
164. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015). 
165. See infra text accompanying notes 183-200. 
166. Abercrombie & Fitch, 135 S. Ct. at 2032. 
167. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012)). 
168. Id. at 2033 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012)). 
169. Id. 
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necessary for liability to attach.o7 0 In a footnote, the Court observed 
that it is arguable that an employer cannot discriminate "'because of 
a 'religious practice'" unless it either knows or suspects the practice to 
be religious.' 7' The Court found it unnecessary to resolve that issue in 
the case, however, because Abercrombie did "at least suspectf" that 
the applicant wore the headscarf for religious reasons and the issue 
was not briefed or argued. 7 2 
Next, the majority rejected the defendant's argument that failure 
to accommodate a religious practice must be brought as a disparate 
impact claim rather than a disparate treatment claim. The Court ex-
plained that that interpretation might have been correct "if Congress 
had limited the meaning of 'religion' . . . to religious belief[sJ' rather 
than including religious practices. 7 3 Because practices are included 
they must be accommodated, and failure to accommodate practices 
can be the subject of a disparate treatment claim. 7 4 The majority fur-
ther rejected Abercrombie's argument that application of a neutral 
policy cannot constitute intentional discrimination. The fact that Ti-
tle VII requires reasonable accommodation of religious practices 
means that it does not require neutral treatment of religious practic-
es; instead, it requires that employers accord religious practices "fa-
vored treatment."7 5 Neutral policies must give way to the need for 
reasonable accommodation.' 7 6 
Justice Alito, concurring, agreed with the majority that it is not a 
prerequisite that an applicant or employee must inform the employer 
of the need for accommodation.' 7 7 However, he took the position that 
an employer cannot be held liable for an adverse action because of an 
employee's religious practice unless the employer knows that the 
practice is for a religious reason. 7 8 In this case, that requirement was 
satisfied because the interviewer came to the correct conclusion that 
the applicant was wearing the headscarf because she was Muslim.'7 9 
Justice Alito explained that intentional discrimination is blamewor-
thy conduct. For an employer to be held liable without knowledge 
would be liability without fault. 80 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 2033 n.3. 
172. Id. at 2033. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 2034. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 2034. 
177. Id. at 2035 (Alito, J., concurring). 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 2036. 
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Next, Justice Alito disagreed with the majority that it is the plain-
tiffs burden to prove the employer's failure to accommodate. Rather, 
he interpreted the statutory text to make it an affirmative defense of 
the employer on which it bears the burdens of production and per-
suasion.' Thus, once the plaintiff proves that the employer took an 
adverse action because of an employee's or applicant's religious ob-
servance or practice, the burden is on the employer to prove that it 
could not reasonably accommodate the observance or practice with-
out undue hardship.82 
Justice Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part. The only 
point on which he agreed with the majority was that there are only 
two causes of action under Title VII-disparate treatment and dis-
parate impact. 83 Justice Thomas then pronounced his main point of 
disagreement with the majority: in his view, application of a neutral 
policy in making an employment decision cannot result in liability for 
intentional discrimination.1 8 4 The opinion reiterates the well-known 
distinctions between disparate treatment and disparate impact.8 5 
Intentional discrimination occurs when an employer treats one em-
ployee or applicant less favorably than another because of a protected 
characteristic. In contrast, disparate impact involves an employer's 
maintenance and application of a facially neutral practice that has a 
significant adverse effect on members of a group with a protected 
characteristic. The disparate impact theory does not require proof of 
intent to discriminate, but the disparate treatment theory does re-
quire such proof.' 8 6 Applying those definitions to the facts of the case, 
Justice Thomas concluded that Abercrombie's facially neutral Look 
Policy could not constitute disparate treatment because it does not 
treat religious practices less favorably than similar secular practic-
es.' 8 7 While the policy may have resulted in liability under the dis-
parate impact theory, the EEOC did not assert that theory.'88 
Justice Thomas contended that the majority expanded the mean-
ing of "intentional discrimination" by including within it an employ-
er's refusal to treat a religious practice more favorably than similar 
secular practices.'89 He argued that the majority's rationale of read-
181. Id. at 2036. 
182. Id. 




187. Id. at 2038. 
188. See id. at 2037. 
189. d. at 2038. 
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ing the definition of religion in section 701(j) into the section prohibit-
ing discrimination does not resolve whether Abercrombie refused to 
hire the applicant because of her religious practice. The key issue is 
whether the phrase "because of such . . . religious practice" means 
that an employer takes an adverse action because of the religious na-
ture of the employee's practice or because the employee's practice 
happens to be religious.19 0 The second meaning is too expansive for 
intentional discrimination because it requires no discriminatory mo-
tive and results in strict liability.' 9 ' Justice Thomas explained that 
the Court long ago had established that intentional discrimination 
requires not that an employer act with awareness that the conse-
quences will disadvantage members of a group with a protected char-
acteristic, but that it act "at least in part 'because of " the adverse 
effect.'92 
Justice Thomas did recognize that an employer's refusal to ac-
commodate may constitute intentional discrimination in a situation 
in which the employer accommodates a similar secular practice, as 
that could involve unequal treatment of like things based on reli-
gion. 19 3 In contrast, the majority's approach requires favored treat-
ment, not equal treatment, to avoid liability for intentional discrim-
ination.194 
Justice Thomas argued that the majority's holding, which treat-
ed the application of a facially neutral policy as intentional discrim-
ination, is inconsistent with longstanding administrative interpre-
tation and precedents in the Court and lower courts.' 9 5 He explained 
that the EEOC, soon after the 1972 amendment of Title VII to de-
fine religion as including a duty to make reasonable accommoda-
tion, espoused an interpretation that failure-to-accommodate claims 
come under disparate impact.'96 Moreover, the Supreme Court did 
not treat failure to accommodate as intentional discrimination in 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison.9 7 Justice Thomas then 
turned to prior court of appeals decisions that had incorrectly inter-
preted Title VII to create an independent claim of failure to accom-
modate that is distinct from disparate treatment and disparate im-
pact. Although their interpretation was incorrect, Justice Thomas 
190. Id. 
191. Id. at 2039. 
192. Id. (quoting Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). 
193. Id. at 2039 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 2039-40. 
196. Id. at 2040. 
197. 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
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explained that they did recognize that application of a facially neu-
tral policy does not come under disparate treatment. 9 8 
Finally, Justice Thomas characterized the EEOC's position on the 
application of a facially neutral policy as having changed from first, the 
position articulated in its Compliance Manual, in which it distinguishes 
failure-to-accommodate claims from disparate treatment claims, and 
second, its earlier position in the Abercrombie & Fitch case, in which it 
distinguished an authority relied upon by the defendant as involving 
intentional discrimination rather than nonaccommodation. 9 9 
Justice Thomas concluded by agreeing with the majority to end 
the concept of a freestanding failure-to-accommodate claim but disa-
greeing with it on the creation of "an entirely new form of liability: 
the disparate-treatment-based-on-equal-treatment claim."2 0 0 
C. Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. 
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.: Eroding the Statutory Basis for 
the Dichotomy of Theories 
The plaintiff, a nonprofit corporation that assists low-income fami-
lies in obtaining affordable housing, sued the Texas department re-
sponsible for distributing federal tax credits for the development of 
housing in low-income areas. o0 The plaintiff sued under the Fair 
Housing Act (FHA),2 0 2 alleging that the department granted too many 
credits in predominantly black inner-city areas and too few in pre-
dominantly white suburban areas, supporting its theory with statis-
tical evidence. 2 0 3 The plaintiff alleged that the effect of this practice 
was to perpetuate "segregated housing patterns."2 0 4 The district court 
applied the disparate impact framework, finding that the plaintiff 
established a prima facie case and that the department failed to sat-
isfy its burden that there were no less discriminatory alternatives.2 0 5 
The Fifth Circuit, following its precedent, held that disparate impact 
claims are available under the FHA, but it reversed and remanded, 
holding that, pursuant to a regulation of the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, the district court should not have shifted 
198. Abercrombie & Fitch, 135 S. Ct. at 2041 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2507, 2514 (2015). 
202. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2012). 
203. Inclusive Cmtys, 135 S. Ct. at 2514. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
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the burden to the defendant to prove a less discriminatory alterna-
tive.20 6 The defendant department filed a petition for writ of certiorari 
raising the question whether the FHA recognizes disparate impact 
claims.20 7 
Before addressing the issue under the FHA, the Court turned to 
two older discrimination statutes-Title VII and the ADEA-to aid 
in interpreting the FHA. The majority concluded that the case law 
under the two employment discrimination statutes "instructs that 
antidiscrimination laws must be construed to encompass dispar-
ate-impact claims when their text refers to the consequences of 
actions and not just to the mindset of actors, and where that in-
terpretation is consistent with statutory purpose."2 0 8 Looking at 
the language of section 804(a),o2 0 the Court explained that the lan-
guage "otherwise make unavailable" refers to the consequences of 
an action rather than [an] actor's intent."21 0 Comparing that lan-
guage with the identical language in section 703(a)(2) of Title VII 
and section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA, the Court found that all three 
support an effects-based theory of discrimination. 2 n Then, surpris-
ingly, the Court stated that the language came "at the end of 
lengthy sentences that begin with prohibitions on disparate 
treatment, [and] they serve as catchall phrases looking to conse-
quences, not intent."21 2 This was the first time that the Court had 
suggested that section 703(a)(2) of Title VII and section 4(a)(2) of 
the ADEA provided for both disparate treatment and disparate 
impact. The Court went on to hold that disparate impact is cog-
nizable under the FHA. 2 1 3 
206. Id. at 2515. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 2518. 
209. Section 804(a) provides: 
As made applicable by section 3603 of this title and except as exempted by 
sections 3603(b) and 3607 of this title, it shall be unlawful-
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse 
to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a 
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or 
national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012). 
210. Inclusive Cmtys, 135 S. Ct. at 2518 (quoting United States v. Giles, 300 U.S. 41, 
48 (1937)). 
211. Id. at 2517-19. 
212. Id. at 2519. 
213. Id. at 2521. 
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D. The Eroding Dichotomies 
1. Blending Theories 
Both Young and Abercrombie & Fitch preserve the plaintiffs' fail-
ure-to-accommodate claims under the disparate treatment theory, 
but they do so by blurring the lines between treatment and impact. 
Although the Court majority in both cases disclaimed that it was di-
verging from established employment discrimination doctrine by 
blending theories, Justice Thomas's dissents insist that it was. 
In the Young adaptation of the McDonnell Douglas pretext analy-
sis, the Court modified two stages of the analysis and blended the 
disparate treatment and disparate impact principles. 2 1 4 At stage two 
of the analysis, the Court stated that the employer normally could 
not satisfy the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason by stating that 
accommodation of pregnant workers would be more expensive or less 
convenient.2 15 A legitimate reason, even if weak, has been sufficient 
to satisfy the employer's burden at stage two. This has been true 
even if the reason given by the employer might support a disparate 
impact claim.2 16 Indeed, in the McDonnell Douglas decision itself the 
error of the lower court was its rejection of the employer's reason for 
not rehiring the plaintiff because the reason was, in the words of the 
lower court, " 'subjective' rather than objective . . . ."217 Thus, the rul-
ing in Young-that legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons can be in-
adequate-is a significant break from past applications of pretext 
analysis and appears to be based on a concern with the disparate im-
pact the excluded reasons would produce. At stage three of the analy-
sis, the blending of theories is palpable. The Court stated that at the 
third stage the plaintiff could prove pretext and reach a jury with 
proof that the employer's policy imposed a significant burden on 
pregnant workers, which the employer's "'legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory' reason[]" could not justify, thereby producing "an inference of 
intentional discrimination."2 8 ' As Professor Brake declares, the 
Court's statement that proof of disparate impact can establish dis-
criminatory intent "rips the seams out of the traditional understand-
ing of what separates impact from treatment claims."2 ' 9 First, contra-
ry to all earlier proclamations in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez,22 o Hazen 
214. Brake, supra note 40, at 560-61. 
215. Young v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1354 (2015). 
216. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 55 (2003). 
217. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803 (1973) (citation omitted). 
218. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354. 
219. Brake, supra note 40, at 584. 
220. 540 U.S. 44, 55 (2003). 
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Paper Co. v. Biggins,2 2 and other decisions, the Court in Young said 
that evidence of impact could establish intent.2 2 2 Second, the Court's 
explanation of stage three essentially engrafts onto it a version of the 
disparate impact defense of business necessity-whether the employ-
er's reasons are good enough to justify the burden imposed. One can 
explain this pretext analysis as heavily infused with disparate im-
pact principles by recognizing that the Court was taking account of 
what appears to be a duty in Title VII to accommodate pregnancy. 
However, the Court was unwilling to so interpret the PDA and to 
recognize a freestanding theory of recovery and cause of action. Ac-
cordingly, it blends treatment and impact in a disfigured version of 
the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework. It is no wonder that the 
Court tried to downplay the significance of the blended analysis it 
fashioned, declaring this analysis to be limited to the PDA, 22 3 and 
stating that most future pregnancy nonaccommodation claims likely 
would be brought and analyzed under the ADA Amendments Act of 
2008.224 Those limitations notwithstanding, the EEOC recognized the 
blending of theories in Young and argued that the decision supported 
the blending advocated for by the agency in EEOC v. Catastrophe 
Management Solutions.2 2 5 
Justice Thomas, dissenting in Abercrombie & Fitch, was correct 
that the majority was blending treatment and impact in a way that 
the Court had eschewed in the past. As Justice Thomas expressed it, 
"equal treatment is not disparate treatment."2 2 6 Although he agreed 
that a nonaccommodation claim could come under disparate treat-
ment, evidence would be needed that the employer denied an accom-
modation for a religious practice while granting it for a similar secu-
lar practice.2 2 7 The factual scenario in Abercrombie & Fitch was simi-
lar to that in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez,2 2 1 in which the employer 
contended that it applied a facially neutral rehire policy to deny a 
former employee and applicant a job.2 2 9 The Court suggested in Ray-
theon that the plaintiff may have successfully pursued a disparate 
impact claim, which he did not timely assert, but could not establish 
221. 507 U.S. 604 (1993). 
222. Brake, supra note 40, at 585. 
223. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1355. 
224. Id. at 1348. 
225. 852 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2016), reh'g denied, 876 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2017). See 
infra Part III.E. 
226. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2039 (2015) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting). 
227. Id. 
228. 540 U.S. 44 (2003). 
229. See supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text (discussing Raytheon). 
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a disparate treatment claim. 2 3 0 In Abercrombie & Fitch, the employer 
argued that its application of a facially neutral practice could not be 
the basis for a disparate treatment claim. The Court majority re-
sponded that while that argument "may make sense in other con-
texts," Title VII does not require mere neutrality regarding religion 
but instead grants it "favored treatment," imposing an affirmative 
obligation on employers. 2 3 1 Thus, as in Young, faced with a defini-
tional statute requiring reasonable accommodation, the Court 
blurred the lines between treatment and impact in order to avoid 
recognizing a separate theory and cause of action for failure to rea-
sonably accommodate but, at the same time, to permit a plaintiff to 
proceed with an intentional discrimination claim. 
The majority's observation in Inclusive Communities that section 
703(a)(2) provides for both disparate treatment and disparate impact 
is, as Professor Sperino has elucidated, a startling revelation, as 
though "Justice Kennedy discovered a new provision in Title VII." 2 3 2 
For decades it has been dogma that disparate treatment emanates 
from section 703(a)(1) and disparate impact from section 703(a)(2). 
As Sperino suggests, the demise of the myth of the distinct origins of 
disparate treatment and disparate impact could be the first step in 
undermining the entire dichotomy-separate theories and separate 
proof structures. It is possible to conceptualize discrimination in dif-
ferent ways,2 3 3 including hybrid structures. 2 3 4 Specifically, Professor 
Sperino noted the modified McDonnell Douglas structure the Court 
fashioned in Young. 
It is arguable that the unexpected recognition of disparate treat-
ment in section 703(a)(2) is not a game-changing development. After 
all, Congress did enact a separate disparate impact provision in Title 
VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.235 However, the new section uses 
the phrase "unlawful employment practice based on disparate im-
pact." 2 3 6 "Unlawful employment practice" is the term used in section 
703(a), 2 3 7 so the tether to the two original subsections remains. Fur-
thermore, the Court in Abercrombie & Fitch explained that Congress, 
by adding the "motivating factor" subsection of Title VII in section 
230. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53, 55 (2003). 
231. Abercrombie & Fitch, 135 S. Ct. at 2034. 
232. Sperino, supra note 5, at 1814. 
233. Id. at 1815. 
234. Id. at 1817. 
235. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(k) (2012). 
236. Id. 
237. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
642, 669 (2001). 
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703(m), 2 3 8 relaxed the "because of' standard of but-for causation 
found in the phrase "because of' in section 703(a)(1). 2 3 9 Left unsaid by 
the Court was that the same "because of' language is in section 
703(a)(2), so the "motivating factor" relaxation of but-for causation 
should apply equally to disparate impact. 2 4 0 If the theories share a 
common causation standard, which serves as the overarching ques-
tion in determining liability, the theories are not truly distinct. 
Moreover, as will be developed further,2 4 1 the Court's recognition of a 
relaxed standard of causation for Title V11 2 4 2 also may offer a statuto-
ry basis for breaking the dichotomy of proof structures and imposing 
a more uniform analysis within disparate treatment under Title VII. 
2. Undermining the McDonnell Douglas Pretext Framework 
The Court's analysis in both Young and Abercrombie & Fitch un-
wittingly demonstrates why the dichotomy of disparate treatment 
proof frameworks cannot be maintained. This should have been clear 
since Desert Palace in 2003. In each of these cases, the Court places a 
failure-to-accommodate claim in one of the treatment proof frame-
works and in the process undermines McDonnell Douglas. 
In Young, the Court instructed that the plaintiff may prove a dis-
parate-treatment-nonaccommodation claim by using the McDonnell 
Douglas framework. 2 4 3 The Court then modified the analysis at stag-
es two and three in fundamental ways that involved a blending of 
treatment and impact, as described above. Ultimately, the modified 
framework does not measure discrimination by proof of pretext at all. 
The impact evidence, which it approves as a means of proving intent, 
does not do so by proving the employer's reason is a pretext. Rather, 
it proves that the employer does not want to bear the burden, ex-
pense, and/or inconvenience of accommodating pregnant employees. 
Although the Court stated that this version of the pretext analysis is 
limited to PDA claims, 2 4 4 it is the latest demonstration that going 
through the three stages of the pretext framework really means very 
little and simply delays and obfuscates the ultimate question of 
238. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012). 
239. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015). 
240. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012). 
241. See infra Part V.A. 
242. This refers to section 703 discrimination claims, not section 704 retaliation claims. 
See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). The Court held in Nassar 
that the "motivating factor" standard applies to section 703, but not section 704, claims. That 
is the current state of the law, but, as I discuss below, I think Nassar should be overruled. 
243. Young v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1353-54 (2015). 
244. Id. at 1355 ("This approach, though limited to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
context. . . ."). 
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whether the employer intentionally discriminated. 2 4 5 Furthermore, 
the Young version of the pretext analysis does not measure but-for 
causation, which McDonnell Douglas has been thought to incorpo-
rate, 24 6 but instead measures a lower standard-perhaps motivating 
factor. 2 4 7 
The Court, in Abercrombie & Fitch, turned to section 703(m)'s 
''motivating factor" standard to explain that the plaintiff need not 
prove knowledge of her religion, but instead motive. 2 48 In so doing, 
the Court invoked the first part of the mixed-motives proof frame-
work, which in statutory form consists of section 703(m) and the 
section 706(g)(2)(B) same-decision defense. The Court explained 
that in Title VII, the "because of' standard of section 703(a) is "re-
laxe[d]" by section 703(m)'s motivating factor standard. 2 4 9 As will 
be discussed in greater depth below, that statement, echoing and 
enhancing a statement made by the Court in University of Texas 
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,25 0 completely undermines 
McDonnell Douglas as a parallel proof structure to mixed-motives. 
3. Potential Impact of the Decisions in Collapsing the Dichotomies 
In the end, the decisions demonstrate that the Court can no 
longer honestly maintain the disparate treatment-disparate im-
pact dichotomy and avoid the proliferation of more theories of dis-
crimination while also effectively addressing claims of discrimina-
tion in the workplace. They also demonstrate that the dichotomy 
of disparate treatment proof structures should be collapsed to one. 
Abercrombie & Fitch leaves little doubt about this latter point. 
There is something exciting about the opinions because there is 
a great need in this area of law for a significant deviation from es-
tablished doctrine. This needed change would strip away many of 
the principles and structures developed by decades of case law and 
would reform the law regarding proof of discrimination in a more 
open-ended and less stylized and rigid way.2 5 ' Young and Aber-
crombie & Fitch may be harbingers of such a transformation. On 
the other hand, there is something frustrating and perhaps stulti-
245. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretext for Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Pro-
posal to Let Employment Discrimination Speak for Itself, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 447, 501-05 
(2013). 
246. See infra Part V.B.3. 
247. I am grateful to Professor Deborah Brake for highlighting this point. 
248. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 (2015). 
249. Id. at 2032. 
250. 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2530 (2013). 
251. Professor Brake defends the Court's doctrinal shift as serving well to address is-
sues of pregnancy discrimination and nonaccommodation. Brake, supra note 40, at 561. 
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fying about the opinions because of their professed adherence to 
established core principles that do not fit the cases well and the 
Court's insistence that nothing is changing.5 2 
E. EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions: The EEOC 
Attempts to Break the Dichotomy of Theories 
The EEOC did not wait long to employ Young in its efforts to 
break the dichotomy, bringing a case that appeared to fit under dis-
parate impact as a disparate treatment claim, and attempting to 
blend principles from disparate treatment and disparate impact. Ac-
cording to the Eleventh Circuit, the EEOC attempted to "conflate[] 
the distinct Title VII theories of disparate treatment . . . and dispar-
ate impact" in EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions.253 
The case involved an employer's withdrawing of an offer of em-
ployment to an applicant because she refused to discontinue wearing 
her hair in dreadlocks. 254 The EEOC pursued only a disparate treat-
ment theory. The EEOC argued that Young stood for the proposition 
that adverse impacts, effects, and disadvantages could establish a 
claim for disparate treatment.25 5 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the 
argument, adhering to dogma that the two theories are embodied in 
separate provisions in Title VII and are not interchangeable. 25 6 The 
court rejected the EEOC's argument, stating that "[b]ecause this is a 
disparate treatment case, and only a disparate treatment case, we do 
not address further the EEOC's arguments that [the defendant's] 
race-neutral grooming policy had (or potentially had) a dispropor-
tionate effect on other black job applicants."257 The court rejected the 
EEOC's reliance on Young, explaining that the rationale and holding 
of Young are limited to the language of the PDA provision.258 Fur-
thermore, the Court explained that it did not interpret Young as 
holding that an employer's neutral policy that has adverse effects on 
members of a protected group, without more, can be the basis for im-
posing liability under disparate treatment.25 1 
It is appropriate that the EEOC attempted to break the dichotomy 
of theories and blend them in Catastrophe Management Solutions. 
252. Id. (predicting that Young does not signal a general upheaval in the dichotomy of 
theories). 
253. 852 F.3d 1018, 1021 (11th Cir. 2016), reh'g denied, 876 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2017). 
254. Id. at 1021-22. 
255. Id. at 1024-25. 
256. Id. at 1024. 
257. Id. at 1024-25. 
258. Id. at 1025. 
259. Id. at 1026. 
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The factual scenario and legal issues presented in the case are simi-
lar to those in Abercrombie & Fitch except the issue is race discrimi-
nation rather than religious discrimination. In both cases, an appli-
cant was denied a job because her dress or grooming practice, which 
was linked to a protected characteristic, violated the company's dress 
or grooming policy, and the employer was not willing to make an ex-
ception or accommodation. Both cases were pled and argued by the 
EEOC as disparate treatment cases. However, both can be accurately 
described as being about an employer's refusal to make a reasonable 
accommodation for a practice linked to a characteristic protected by 
Title VII. Catastrophe Management Solutions presented an oppor-
tunity for the Eleventh Circuit to recognize the blending of disparate 
treatment and disparate impact, but the court felt constrained by the 
limitation announced by the Supreme Court in Young that its analy-
sis in that case was limited to pregnancy discrimination claims."'o 
IV. THE VERISIMILITUDE OF ORDER 
The center of employment discrimination law depends on two ex-
clusive and distinct theories of employment discrimination emanat-
ing from separate subsections of the statutes with each theory having 
associated proof structures. Each claim of discrimination is analyzed 
by categorizing it within the applicable theory and then the appro-
priate proof structure. That is order. But the semblance of order is a 
facade; Young and Abercrombie & Fitch are the latest glimpses into 
the chaos beneath this facade. This Part discusses the verisimilitude 
of order and why it is important that the current disorder give way to 
a more accurate core doctrine. 
A. The Disarray of the Current Statutes 
Our principal employment discrimination statutes are a mess. 
Congress enacted three principal laws: Title VII enacted in 1964,261 
the ADEA enacted in 1967,'262 and the ADA enacted in 1990.263 Over 
five decades, Congress has amended these laws several times in an 
effort to keep pace with the doctrinal developments in the Supreme 
260. Young v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1355 (2015) ("This approach, 
though limited to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act context. . . ."). 
261. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17). 
262. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634). 
263. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213). 
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Court. Among the amendments have been the PDA in 1978;264 the 
amendment to add the definition of religion, including nonaccommo-
dation, in 1972;265 the Civil Rights Act of 1991;266 the ADA Amend-
ments Act of 2008;267 and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.268 
A basic problem is that much has happened in the case law devel-
opment of employment discrimination law since 1964 and 1967, and 
Title VII and the ADEA have not been amended to take account of 
much of that development. The amendments of Title VII that have 
been enacted have been principally legislative abrogations of Su-
preme Court decisions with which Congress disagreed, although 
some of the amendments have adopted Court doctrine or a modified 
version. There has been no comprehensive reconsideration of the 
laws in light of over fifty years of development and evolution of doc-
trine, and there has been no substantial harmonization of the three 
laws. 
The ADA, the most recently enacted of the three laws, is the law 
that best takes account of the doctrine developed since 1964. The 
ADA also was significantly amended in 2008 by the ADA Amend-
ments Act.2 6 9 To get a sense of the difference between the ADA and 
the two earlier laws, compare the section prohibiting discrimination 
in Title VII, section 703,270 with that under the ADA, section 102.271 
The ADA section is more detailed than that in Title VII and evidenc-
es Congress's awareness of theories or causes of action developed in 
the case law over the years. 
The most ambitious amendment of the employment discrimination 
laws was the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Its purpose was to overturn a 
number of Supreme Court opinions 272 and to create a freestanding 
section 1981a, providing for damages and a concomitant right to a 
jury trial in intentional discrimination cases under Title VII (when 
264. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)). 
265. Act of Mar. 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012)). 
266. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
267. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553-54 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012)). 
268. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified in 
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
269. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§12101-12213). 
270. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
271. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (2012). 
272. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, at 2-4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 694-96. 
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unavailable under section 1981) and the ADA. 27 3 While the 1991 Act 
addressed a number of problems in employment discrimination law 
and should be considered a positive development in many ways, it 
also bred much of the asymmetry that currently exists in employ-
ment discrimination law. Because the 1991 Act amended Title VII to 
add statutory versions of the mixed-motives analysis 274 and the dis-
parate impact analysis,27 5 but did not similarly amend the ADEA and 
the ADA, the Supreme Court has interpreted the 1991 Act as creat-
ing asymmetry by holding that there is no mixed-motives analysis 
under the ADEA2 7 6 and holding that the disparate impact analysis 
under the ADEA differs from the statutory version in Title VII.2 7 7 The 
Court also interpreted the 1991 Act as creating asymmetry within 
Title VII, construing the motivating factor standard and mixed-
motives analysis as not applying to the antiretaliation provision in 
Title VII.27 1 
To appreciate the state of the statutes, consider a few statutory 
problems that were implicated in Young, Abercrombie & Fitch, and 
Inclusive Communities. First, the PDA that was at issue in Young 
was Congress's response to a Supreme Court decision that rejected a 
pregnancy discrimination claim because Title VII prohibited sex dis-
crimination, not pregnancy discrimination.2 7 9 To fix that interpreta-
tion, Congress amended section 701 to provide a definition of sex dis-
crimination that includes "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions."2 8 0 Did Congress intend to provide for a duty of reasonable 
accommodation for pregnancy? Because Congress principally was 
overturning a Supreme Court decision that defined sex discrimina-
tion in a way with which Congress disagreed, it placed the new sec-
tion in the definitions section of Title VII, and the matter of whether 
the statute imposed a duty of accommodation was unclear, as Young 
demonstrated. 
Second, as Title VII was amended to include a duty of reasonable 
accommodation for religious beliefs and practices, is failure to accom-
modate a separate theory or cause of action for religious discrimination 
under Title VII? The Court in Abercrombie & Fitch said that it is not. 
As with pregnancy, that may be because the 1972 amendment that 
273. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(1)-(2) (2012). 
274. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m) & 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012). 
275. Id. § 2000e-2(k). 
276. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
277. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
278. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). 
279. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
280. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
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added section 701(j) to define religion to include failure to accommo-
date was a congressional reaction to EEOC guidelines interpreting the 
law as creating a duty to accommodate religious belief or practice2 1' 
and court of appeals decisions that rejected efforts to extend religious 
discrimination to nonaccommodation.2 8 2 As already discussed, the 
Court's conclusion in Abercrombie & Fitch that there is not a separate 
theory or cause of action under Title VII for nonaccommodation of reli-
gion was surprising to many. 2 8 3 It seems that the Court ruled as it did 
because Congress placed the accommodation requirement in the defi-
nitional section 701, not the prohibition of unlawful employment prac-
tices in section 703. Of course, this was precisely the case with preg-
nancy accommodation in Young as well. As Professor Noah D. Zatz 
observes, Congress amended the definitions of religion and pregnancy 
rather than the definition of discrimination, retaining a "nominal 
commitment" to disparate treatment (intent) but concomitantly ren-
dering it incoherent. 2 8 4 Presumably the Court would not hold that 
there is no separate theory of nonaccommodation if it were interpret-
ing the duty to provide reasonable accommodation under the ADA be-
cause section 102 specifically states that failure to accommodate is a 
distinct form of unlawful discrimination. 
Third, where is the disparate impact theory or cause of action lo-
cated in Title VII? The Court in Inclusive Communities accepted the 
party line that Griggs discovered it in section 703(a)(2).2 8 1 Justice 
Thomas agreed with that and railed against that discovery.286 Of 
course this debate about section 703(a)(2) mattered in Inclusive 
Communities because the Title VII section, as well as the ADEA pro-
vision, was being used to interpret similar language in the FHA. 
However, if limited to employment discrimination law, one could say 
that the debate about section 703(a)(2), disparate impact, and Griggs 
is old news and matters little because Congress, in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, codified a proof framework for disparate impact in sec-
tion 703(k).2 8 7 Essentially, it does not matter whether the Court was 
right to glean disparate impact from section 703(a)(2) because Con-
gress expressly recognized the theory in the 1991 Act. However, the 
703(a)(2)/Griggs issue is relevant to the debate about the absolute 
dichotomy-the distinction between disparate treatment and dispar-
281. Oppenheimer, supra note 14, at 937-38. 
282. See, e.g., id. at 938-39; Corrada, supra note 44, at 1427-31. 
283. See supra notes 43-44. 
284. Zatz, supra note 14, at 1428. 
285. Tex. Dep't Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2516-17 
(2015). 
286. Id. at 2526-27 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
287. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012). 
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ate impact. Moreover, section 703(k), added by the 1991 Act, is made 
to derive from 703(a) as it refers to "unlawful employment practice," 
which is the term used by section 703.288 Thus, it is a sound argument 
that disparate impact is derived from section 703(a)(2) and still re-
sides there, and section 703(k) merely establishes or restores the 
proof framework for the theory. That interpretation seems to be con-
sistent with the analysis in Inclusive Communities. 
Fourth, of the several problems created by Congress in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, two are based on the Supreme Court's dichotomy 
of employment discrimination theories. First, in the new section 
1981a, Congress sought to create a right to recover compensatory 
and/or punitive damages under both Title VII for sex, national origin, 
and religious intentional discrimination claims and the ADA for dis-
abilities claims. The right already existed for race claims if plaintiffs 
sued under section 1981.289 When such damages are claimed, the 
statute also creates a right to a jury trial.2 9 o In part then, section 
1981a was to make other Title VII claims more equal to race 
claims. 2 9 ' But they are not quite equal because, in order to achieve 
passage of the law, it was necessary to cap damages in section 1981a, 
and such caps do not exist for race claims brought under section 
1981. In creating the rights to damages and a jury trial, Congress 
also unwisely, in my view, ensconced, to some extent, the disparate 
treatment-disparate impact dichotomy in the statutes. Damages were 
made available for claims of "intentional discrimination (not an em-
ployment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate im-
pact)."2 9 2 This distinction was not original to Congress, however, as 
the Supreme Court interpreted disparate treatment claims as cog-
nizable under section 1981, but not disparate impact. 2 9 3 Thus, Con-
gress, in limiting damages and jury trials to intentional discrimina-
tion as distinguished from impact-based discrimination, was follow-
ing and codifying a Court interpretation. 2 9 4 However, this distinction 
appears quite accidental, as it was based not on a careful considera-
tion of what damages should be available under the Title VII theories 
288. See Jolls, supra note 237, at 669. 
289. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012). 
290. Id. § 1981a(c). 
291. Congress did not address the ADEA in section 1981a because it has a different 
remedial scheme that is based on the Fair Labor Standards Act and provides for liquidated 
damages for willful violations. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2012). 
292. 42 U.S.C. §1981a(1)-(2) (2012). 
293. Gen. Bldg. Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 381-90 (1982). 
294. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, at 25 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 717-
18; id. at 69, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 755 (dissenting views). 
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of discrimination but on the Court's interpretation of section 1981, a 
post-Civil War civil rights statute. 
A second part of the 1991 Act codifies an aspect of the dichotomy 
of theories. Echoing the Supreme Court in UWA v. Johnson Con-
trols,2 9 5 Congress placed in the statutory disparate impact proof 
structure a provision that states that the statutory defense to dispar-
ate impact-business necessity/job relatedness-is not applicable to a 
disparate treatment claim, for which the statutory defense is a bona 
fide occupational qualification. The statute states that "[a] demon-
stration that an employment practice is required by business necessi-
ty may not be used as a defense against a claim of intentional dis-
crimination under this subchapter."2 9 6 
The foregoing statutory provisions and the Court's interpretations 
in Young and Abercrombie & Fitch of the PDA and the definition of 
religion, respectively, make debunking the dichotomy and expanding 
the theories more difficult. Nonetheless, there are judicial interpreta-
tions of the current statutes that can accomplish this result to some 
degree.2 9 7 The better approach, however, is for Congress (1) to repeal 
the statutory recognition of the dichotomy of theories in section 
1981a, and (2) to amend Title VII and the ADEA to expressly provide 
for several theories, causes of action, or unlawful practices, following 
the model of the ADA. 
B. Theories and Proof Frameworks Gone Awry 
While the Court declared disparate treatment and disparate 
impact the exclusive "causes of action" in Abercrombie & Fitch,29 8 
it often has referred to them as "theories,"'2 9 9 indeed referring to 
them as such in Young. 300 On the other hand, many authorities, 
including justices on the Supreme Court, have referred to dispar-
ate treatment and disparate impact as ways of proving a claim of 
discrimination. 3 0 1 A way of proving a claim of discrimination is dif-
295. 499 U.S. 187, 197-98 (1991). The case is discussed supra text accompanying notes 
100-04. 
296. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2) (2012). 
297. See infra Part V.B. 
298. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015). 
299. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977), 
quoted supra text accompanying note 52; see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 
604, 609-10 (1993). 
300. Young v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1361 (2015). 
301. See Gold, supra note 25, at 173-75 (citing, with other authorities, the dissenting 
opinion of Justice Powell in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 458-59 (1982), and the plu-
rality opinion in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank, 487 U.S. 977, 985-87 (1988)). 
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ferent than a theory of discrimination. 3 0 2 The proof frameworks 
with their steps or elements approximate the elements of a tort 
claim-slots into which evidence must be inserted on pain of dis-
missal for failure to satisfy an element- 303 although there are dif-
ferences. Courts do not adhere to the elements of the proof struc-
tures as strictly or consistently as they do the elements of tort the-
ories. 3 0 4 The proof frameworks also differ from the elements in tort 
claims in that the McDonnell Douglas framework incorporates 
shifting burdens of production, and the mixed-motives framework 
includes a shifting burden of persuasion. Despite the differences, 
just as one must fit evidence into the elements of fraud or battery, 
for example, to prove intentional tort liability, one must fit evi-
dence into a proof structure to prove discrimination. The proof 
structures are the templates used to prove discrimination. 
It should not be surprising that the theories often are merged 
with the proof structures and thought of as a way of proving dis-
crimination. From their origins, the two theories have been devel-
oped in conjunction with their proof frameworks, as they were in 
Griggs and McDonnell Douglas. Under the dichotomy-based core, 
any given claim is categorized under the appropriate theory and 
then analyzed under the appropriate affiliated proof framework. 
For purposes of this section, I will adopt the Court's common char-
acterization of disparate treatment and disparate impact as theo-
ries of discrimination and treat them as overarching explanations 
of discrimination and discrimination law doctrine and the proof 
frameworks as providing the elements of proof and analysis. 
302. Professors Linda Hamilton Krieger and Susan T. Fiske explain that a claim 
for relief can be viewed as a "claim schema" with a narrative side and a formal analyt-
ical side. On the formal analytical side, a claim schema can be divided into a set of 
essential elements that must be present in a narrative in order for the claimant to 
recover. Thus, in order to recover, a claimant must introduce evidence of each element. 
See Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment 
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 
1011-12 (2006). 
303. Id. at 1012. Krieger and Fiske distill the elements of disparate treatment as 
follows: (1) member of a protected group; (2) subjected to an adverse employment ac-
tion; and (3) protected status was a motivating factor in the adverse action. Id. 
304. For example, the Supreme Court stated in the McDonnell Douglas opinion 
itself that the prima facie proof required "is not necessarily applicable in every respect 
to differing factual situations." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 
n.13 (1973). Moreover, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiffs complaint is not in-
sufficient and subject to dismissal for failure to plead the elements of the McDonnell 
Douglas prima facie case in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002). 
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1. Theoretical Disarray 
The Court has proclaimed that under Title VII (and the ADEA)305 
there are two, and only two, well-defined and discrete theories of dis-
crimination. That is the core of employment discrimination law doc-
trine, but it is not an accurate description of the law. It is a matter of 
some importance to see the inaccuracy and to appreciate the poten-
tial consequences of maintaining this false dichotomy. Although I 
concede that there is a reasonable argument that the best path for 
the future of employment discrimination law is to maintain the false 
dichotomy, I think we have reached the point at which that path 
should no longer be followed. 
Theories of recovery should provide cogent explanations as to why 
the law permits a recovery for certain actions. Because the Supreme 
Court often treats employment discrimination law as tort law and 
imports tort law principles, 3 0 6 it is useful to think of the characteris-
tics of tort theories of recovery. The overarching tort theories are in-
tentional torts, negligence, and strict liability.3 0 7 Each theory is de-
fined to a large extent by an element or elements common to all 
claims under its ambit, such as intent for all intentional torts and 
failure to exercise reasonable care and causation for all negligence 
claims. Generally, the principles and doctrine developed under one 
theory are cabined under that theory, but there are some migrations 
across theories, such as in comparative fault and products liability. 
The three tort theories provide an explanation for all of the claims for 
which recovery is permitted in tort law. 
Disparate treatment and disparate impact are the analogous theo-
ries of recovery in employment discrimination law. The Court has 
made three claims regarding these theories that do not accurately 
describe them. First, the Court has described the two theories as 
well-defined and cohesive with each having a unifying concept. Sec-
ond, the Court has described them as distinct, insisting that their 
305. Presumably, there is still a freestanding theory of failure to make reasonable ac-
commodations under the ADA. See CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 373 (9th ed. 2017). Prior to Abercrom-
bie & Fitch, courts treated failure to accommodate as a separate theory of recovery or cause 
of action under the ADA and stated a separate framework for nonaccommodation claims. 
See, e.g., Basith v. Cook Cty., 241 F.3d 919, 927 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Thus, under the ADA, 
there are two distinct categories of disability discrimination claims: failure to accommodate 
and disparate treatment."). Abercrombie & Fitch does not necessarily dictate that reasona-
ble accommodation is not a separate theory under the ADA because the requirement of 
reasonable accommodation is situated in the section defining prohibited discrimination, 42 
U.S.C. § 12112, rather than in definitional provisions as in Title VI. 
306. See infra notes 314-17 and accompanying text. 
307. See Catherine E. Smith, Looking to Torts: Exploring the Risks of Workplace Dis-
crimination, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1207, 1215 (2014). 
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tenets and doctrine cannot be blended. Third, the Court has declared 
that they are the exclusive theories of recovery. The order at the core 
of employment discrimination law is based on these myths. 
The Court in its earliest declaration of order and dichotomy in In-
ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States 308 stated that 
disparate treatment is the "most easily understood type of discrimi-
nation," based on unequal treatment with proof of discriminatory mo-
tive being required. 3 0 9 As the theory has developed and evolved, it has 
become clear that it is not so easily understood. 3 1 0 It is not clear 
whether the key animating principle is unequal treatment, intent, 
motive, 3 1 1 or a standard of causation. 3 12 Given the early theories of 
discrimination that were combined under disparate treatment-
economic harm motivated by animus and economic harm caused by 
unequal treatment of similarly situated persons- 313 the confusion 
should not be surprising. 
The Supreme Court has drawn from tort law to develop the theo-
ries and principles of employment discrimination law, even refer-
ring to employment discrimination statutes as "federal tort[s]."314 
Most of the importation of tort law has occurred within disparate 
treatment. 3 1 5 The tort law analogue for disparate treatment is in-
tentional torts, for which a plaintiff must prove "intent," defined as 
purpose (desire) or knowledge to a substantial certainty that the 
tortious result will occur. 3 1 6 Although the tort concept may align 
308. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
309. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
310. See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace 
Mirage, 47 WM. & IVARY L. REV. 911, 914-15 (2005) [hereinafter Sullivan, Disparate Impact]. 
311. See id. (discussing the Court's vacillation between motive and intent). 
312. See, e.g., Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the 
Mixed-Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17 (1991) 
(discussing the nuances of mixed-motives cases and criticizing the focus on causation). 
313. See supra text accompanying notes 61-64 (discussing early theories of discrimina-
tion as described by Professor Blumrosen). 
314. The Court declared that "when Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the back-
ground of general tort law." Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2011); Price Water-
house v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Several scholars 
have been critical of the seemingly unprincipled importation of unmodified tort principles 
into employment discrimination law. See generally Martha Chamallas & Sandra F. Speri-
no, Torts and Civil Rights Law: Migration and Conflict: Symposium Introduction, 75 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1021 (2014). 
315. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 317 (discussing Supreme Court decisions that 
imported tort law into disparate treatment); see also Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination 
Statutes, the Common Law, and Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (discussing the 
Court's use of proximate cause as the standard for "cat's paw" or derivative liability). 
316. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (AM. LAW INST. 1965); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS § BA (Am. LAW INST. 2000); Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1092-94 
(Wash. 1955). 
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with harm motivated by animus, it does not necessarily match 
harm caused by unequal treatment of similarly situated persons, 
which can be merely negligent. The analogy between disparate 
treatment and intentional torts seems even more suspect in view of 
the fact that the causation standards incorporated into disparate 
treatment, 3 1 7 including proximate cause, 3 1 8 are drawn from negli-
gence law. 
Disparate impact never has been well defined, and its underlying 
rationale is nebulous'.3 9 From its origin in Griggs, there was the de-
bate regarding whether disparate impact is a means of "smoking 
out" veiled intentional discrimination or it is in fact a distinct ef-
fects-based theory. 3 2 0 The Court's efforts to keep disparate impact 
distinct from disparate treatment and to avoid having it become a 
subset of intentional discrimination suffered a setback in Watson v. 
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, in which the Court reluctantly recognized 
that disparate impact could be applied to subjective employment 
practices. 3 2 1 The Court in Watson recognized that "some employ-
ment practices, adopted without a deliberately discriminatory mo-
tive, may in operation be functionally equivalent to intentional 
discrimination." 3 2 2 
Given the uncertainty about disparate impact, it is unsurprising 
that the tort analogue for disparate impact is unclear. Professor 
Blumrosen identified res ipsa loquitur and strict liability as the 
common law parallels for the early theory of disparate impact. 3 2 3 
However, given the development of the theory in case law, coupled 
with Congress's adoption of a proof structure in Title VII that has 
stages of business necessity/job relatedness 324 and alternative em-
ployment practices, 3 2 5 it appears ultimately to be negligence-
based.3 26 
317. Regarding the importation of tort causation standards, see Sandra F. Sperino, The 
Tort Label, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1055-67 (2014); Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Con-
gressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 
881-900 (2012). 
318. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011). 
319. See, e.g., Jolls, supra note 237, at 652-53; Sullivan, Disparate Impact, supra note 
310, at 964. 
320. See, e.g., Jolls, supra note 237, at 652-53 (discussing broad and narrow conceptions 
of disparate impact); Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 59 
FORDHAM L. REV. 523 (1991) (describing fault theory and effects theory). 
321. 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
322. Id. at 987. See Sullivan, Disparate Impact, supra note 310, at 964-65. 
323. Blumrosen, supra note 60, at 67. 
324. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
325. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii). 
326. See, e.g., Oppenheimer, supra note 14, at 931. 
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Separation and distinctiveness of theories is another tenet of the 
mythical order, which the Court has declared many times.3 2 7 Despite 
its blending of the theories, Young is unlikely to be read by either the 
Supreme Court or lower courts as a significant departure from the 
dichotomy or as authorizing further departures. 23 8 Indeed, the Court 
majority in Young disclaimed the dissent's argument that it was 
blending theories and announced that the allegedly hybrid analysis 
was limited to PDA claims. 3 2 9 The Court also is unlikely to interpret 
Abercrombie & Fitch as authorizing further blending of theories. In-
deed, the Court majority did not seem to think it had violated the di-
chotomy of theories, offering no response to the dissent's characteri-
zation of the theory as "disparate-treatment-based-on-equal-
treatment." 3 3 0 
A third myth is that there are only two theories of discrimina-
tion. 33 1 That myth is sustainable in part because of the amorphous 
nature of the two accepted theories. Many theories, claims, or 
causes of action have been forced into disparate treatment or dis-
parate impact, with disparate treatment taking the lion's share. 
Hostile environment harassment claims, third-party harassment 
claims, failure to accommodate claims, and gender, race, or other 
stereotyping claims often have been categorized as disparate 
treatment claims, although many such claims appear to be negli-
gence-based. The scholarly critiques of the unsuitable fit between 
these types of claims and disparate treatment, as it has been de-
fined by the Court, have been legion. For example, Professor Noah 
Zatz contended that third-party harasser claims do not exhibit the 
intent requirement of disparate treatment and instead import a 
reasonable accommodation mandate into Title VII that does not 
appear in the statutory language. 3 3 2 He identified a unifying and 
overarching concept in membership causation. 3 3 3 Many commenta-
327. See supra Part II.A. 
328. See e.g., EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1025 (11th Cir. 
2016) (stating that "Young, however, does not work a dramatic shift in disparate 
treatment jurisprudence"); Brake, supra note 40, at 561 (predicting that "Young does 
not likely forecast a more general upheaval of the boundary separating disparate im-
pact and disparate treatment"). 
329. Young v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1355 (2015) (stating that "the 
continued focus on whether the plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence to give rise to 
an inference of intentional discrimination avoids confusing the disparate-treatment and 
disparate-impact doctrines"). 
330. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2041 (2015) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting). 
331. Id. at 2032 (majority opinion). 
332. Zatz, supra note 14, at 1362. 
333. Zatz, supra note 14. 
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tors have noted that sexual harassment claims do not fit well un-
der disparate treatment. 3 3 4 Professor David Oppenheimer de-
scribed this phenomenon generally, explaining that the existing 
employment discrimination law frequently and-in many types of 
cognizable claims-actually is based on negligence, 3 35 although the 
Court does not acknowledge this. 
The classification of types of claims under the dichotomy of theo-
ries becomes particularly vexatious when courts place failure-to-
accommodate claims under disparate treatment, as the Supreme 
Court did in Young and Abercrombie & Fitch. Of course, the require-
ment of reasonable accommodation is expressly provided for in Title 
VII for only religion and arguably pregnancy. It also exists in the 
ADA, where, unlike under Title VII, the section prohibiting discrimi-
nation lists it as a separately enumerated act of discrimination. 3 36 
Before Abercrombie & Fitch, most courts treated failure to make rea-
sonable accommodation for religion as a separate theory or cause of 
action under Title VII, 3 3 7 and religious nonaccommodation claims 
could be said to require notice and be negligence-based. 3 38 Not until 
Young and Abercrombie & Fitch was the Court squarely confronted 
with nonaccommodation as a separate theory or cause of action. 
Most scholars think that nonaccommodation is a theory of dis-
crimination that is distinct in fundamental ways from the equal 
treatment underpinnings of disparate treatment. 3 3 9 Indeed, the re-
quirement of accommodation is often juxtaposed with antidiscrimina-
tion as a distinct concept. Under that view, antidiscrimination re-
quires disregard of differences, equal treatment, and is redistributive 
only to the extent necessary to produce such equal treatment, where-
as accommodation requires regard of differences, special treatment, 
334. See Brake, supra note 40, at 586 (stating that harassment claims, although cate-
gorized as disparate treatment, are "difficult to situate as simple disparate treatment"); 
Henry L. Chambers, Jr., A Unifying Theory of Sex Discrimination, 34 GA. L. REV. 1591, 
1593 (2000) (positing that sexual harassment hostile environment claims do not fit well 
under disparate treatment and recommending creation of a new cause of action combining 
hostile environment and disparate treatment). Cf. Zatz, supra note 14, at 1367 (positing 
that hostile environment claims do not invoke a distinct theory but are instead "something 
else entirely: a form of harm"). 
335. Oppenheimer, supra note 14, at 937-69 (listing harassment, nonaccommodation, 
and stereotyping as examples of negligence-based employment discrimination). 
336. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b)(5)(A) (2012). 
337. Corrada, supra note 44, at 1411 (2009); Zatz, supra note 14, at 1369. 
338. Zatz, supra note 14, at 1364 (citing Oppenheimer). 
339. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: 
Can Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 
79 N.C. L. REV. 307 (2001); Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimi-
nation, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1 (1996); see also Oppenheimer, 
supra note 14, at 937-44 (describing failure to accommodate as negligence based). 
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and is redistributive in that it imposes special costs due to the differ-
ences and special treatment.3 4 0 Yet, Professor Christine Jolls has 
demonstrated that there is significant overlap between the broader 
field of antidiscrimination law and accommodation.341 Although ac-
commodation may be, for the most part, distinct from equal treat-
ment, disparate impact, in several respects, imposes requirements of 
accommodation.3 4 2 
In the groundbreaking decision of Hively v. Ivy Tech Community 
College, in which the en banc Seventh Circuit pronounced that dis-
crimination because of sexual orientation is discrimination because of 
sex, the court noted that the Supreme Court has recognized a variety 
of claims under employment discrimination law that may have sur-
prised the members of the 88th Congress, which enacted Title VII.3 4 3 
The court mentioned sexual harassment, same-sex sexual harass-
ment, discrimination based on actuarial assumptions, and gender 
stereotyping as among those claims. 3 4 4 
Thus, the Court's proclamation that there are only two theories of 
discrimination is a dubious proposition descriptively. The Court is 
able to sustain it only because of the amorphous definitions and con-
tours of the two accepted theories. Most significantly, disparate 
treatment is not limited to intentional discrimination, and the Court 
and courts have forced diverse theories under disparate treatment. 
That was true even before Young and Abercrombie & Fitch. 
This inaccurate description might be tolerable if it did not have 
significant deleterious effects, but it sometimes leads to bad results 
in employment discrimination law. Categorization under a theory 
matters because the Court and Congress have been clear that inten-
tional discrimination is the principal evil targeted by Congress in 
1964.345 Intentional discrimination is the theory for which Congress, 
in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, created greater rights. Because of the 
Court's and Congress's greater condemnation of intentional discrimi-
nation and the practical advantages of pursuing intentional discrim-
ination claims, the EEOC has tried to fit claims, whenever viable, 
under disparate treatment, as in Catastrophe Management Solu-
tions.3 4 6 When the EEOC or any plaintiff categorizes a claim as dis-
340. See Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 339. 
341. See Jolls, supra note 237, at 651 (positing that "there is no way ... to distinguish 
the specified aspects of antidiscrimination law from requirements of accommodation"). 
342. Id. at 653-66. 
343. 853 F.3d 339, 345 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
344. Id. 
345. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). 
346. 852 F.3d 1018, 1021 (11th Cir. 2016), reh'g denied, 876 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2017); 
see supra Part III.E. 
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parate treatment or disparate impact, a couple of problems can re-
sult. For one, if the court disagrees with the plaintiff about the ap-
propriate theory for the claim, the plaintiff may lose the case, as in 
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez and Catastrophe Management Solu-
tions.34 7 For another, unclear and confusing case law can be produced 
as a result of trying to fit a claim within a single, distinct theory that 
is not a good fit, as in Young and Abercrombie & Fitch. 
Beyond its descriptive inaccuracy, the limitation of discrimination 
to two distinct theories is normatively troubling. Many scholars have 
discussed the need for the law of discrimination to address "second 
generation" discrimination, 43 8 in which the discrimination is more 
subtle, implicit, cognitive, and/or structural: "[c]ognitive bias, struc-
tures of decisionmaking, and patterns of interaction have replaced 
deliberate racism and sexism as the frontier of much continued me-
quality." 3 9 4 Many scholars have argued that the current theories and 
"tools" of employment discrimination law are ill suited to addressing 
such discrimination. 350 More than half a century after the enactment 
of the first employment discrimination law, a variety of theories, 
many of which already have been recognized but forced under dis-
parate treatment, should better achieve the objectives of employment 
discrimination law going forward rather than pretending that cog-
nizable claims fit under a theory supposedly based on intent that has 
been stretched beyond recognition. 
I concede, however, that there is a good argument for tolerating 
the myths and accepting the problems associated with them. Because 
the Court, Congress, and society seem most comfortable with law 
that provides redress for intentional discrimination, 3 51 it may be that 
employment discrimination law has a better chance to develop and 
address various types of discrimination by the Court's blending em-
ployment discrimination law theories while saying that it is not and 
347. 540 U.S. 44 (2003); 852 F. 3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2016). 
348. See, e.g., TRISTIN K. GREEN, DISCRIMINATION LAUNDERING: THE RISE OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL INNOCENCE AND THE CRISIS OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LAW (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2017); Sturm, supra note 98, at 460; Bornstein, Reckless, supra note 14, at 
1061-62; see also Bagenstos, supra note 98. 
349. Sturm, supra note 98, at 460. 
350. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 98, at 12-14. 
351. The Court declared disparate treatment to be the "most obvious evil Congress had 
in mind when it enacted Title VI." Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 
335 n.15 (1977); see also Bagenstos, supra note 98, at 3-4 (observing that there is limited 
political support for extending discrimination law beyond a broadly accepted class of cases 
based on employer fault); Ford, supra note 14, at 1391 (describing the comfort associated 
with defining discrimination as decisions motivated by a discrete state of mind and the 
discomfort associated with the doctrine of effects or impact); Michael Selmi, Was the Dis-
parate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 773 (2006) (discussing the crucial 
role that blame and intent play in fostering willingness to remedy discrimination). 
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classifying under the disparate treatment theory claims that do not 
fit. In a similar vein, Professor Michael Selmi argued that recognition 
of the disparate impact theory by the Court in 1971 in Griggs was a 
mistake because the unintended consequence limited the develop-
ment of a more expansive concept of intent.3 5 2 Arguably, the Court is 
now doing what Selmi argued should have been done rather than 
recognizing an alternative theory-expanding the definition of intent. 
While there is merit to the idea of expanding the definition of in-
tent and the concept of disparate treatment, it is not now as promis-
ing an approach as it would have been in 1971 when Griggs was de-
cided. Disparate treatment has been developed and defined over sev-
eral decades. It is defined by concepts of motive, tort causation, and 
proof structures that supposedly incorporate those concepts. The re-
sult when trying to fit other theories into disparate treatment is what 
we have in Young and Abercrombie & Fitch-a Court uncomfortably 
trying to make such claims work while providing reassurances that 
there are only two distinct theories. Thus, this expansion now looks 
like judicial sleight of hand. It seems as likely that this approach is 
not sustainable and soon will jeopardize rather than confirm political 
and societal support for employment discrimination law. Professor 
Robert Post posits that it can be damaging to the doctrinal structure 
of the law when judges cannot explain the actual justifications for 
their decisions.3 5 3 Judges, lawyers, and citizens can lose confidence in 
the integrity of the law when legal doctrine appropriates terms that 
have a common meaning and uses them in ways that bear little re-
semblance to that meaning. 
There are significant descriptive and normative problems associ-
ated with the anachronistic order of two distinct and exclusive theo-
ries of discrimination. In light of these problems, the Court in Young 
and Abercrombie & Fitch, notwithstanding its blending of theories, 
failed to take opportunities to break the dichotomy of theories and 
begin fashioning a better order. Nonetheless, there is a seed of hope 
in the opinions that the Court and courts could use to fashion a new 
core. 
2. The Proof Frameworks 
The difficulties posed by the two proof structures for individual 
disparate treatment have been chronicled exhaustively.3 5 4 Young and 
352. Selmi, supra note 351, at 706. 
353. Cf. Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimina-
tion Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 33 & 33 n.152 (2000) (although recognizing that important 
values can be served by "judicial indirection" and inarticulate expression). 
354. See supra Part I.B. 
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Abercrombie & Fitch provide the latest reminders of why the two dis-
tinct and exclusive frameworks do not provide useful tools of proof 
and analysis, which is what they were designed to be. First, there is 
no line of demarcation as to which applies in any given case. Second, 
Young appears to be a reaffirmation of the continuing viability of the 
pretext analysis, but Abercrombie & Fitch unwittingly undermines 
it.3 5 5 However, I think that the deformed pretext analysis developed 
in Young provides little support for the proposition that pretext anal-
ysis remains a parallel proof structure to mixed motives. Abercrom-
bie & Fitch demonstrates why the McDonnell Douglas pretext analy-
sis should not survive the combination of enactments of both the Civ-
il Rights Act of 1991 and the Desert Palace decisions. Although the 
sustainability of the pretext analysis was debatable after Desert Pal-
ace, Abercrombie & Fitch should be the last nail in the coffin of 
McDonnell Douglas. At a minimum, the Supreme Court should de-
clare that proof that the employer's reason for the adverse action is 
pretextual is merely a way of satisfying the statutory standard that 
discrimination is a motivating factor .356 
In Young, the Court instructed that a plaintiff pursuing a preg-
nancy nonaccommodation claim could prove disparate treatment by 
using the pretext framework and using impact-type evidence to prove 
pretext and intent.3 5 7 Why did the Court not at least discuss the al-
ternative of the mixed-motives analysis using the statutory "motivat-
ing factor" standard? The answer cannot be that there was no direct 
evidence for two reasons: first, there was direct evidence, and second, 
the direct/circumstantial evidence line was erased by Desert Palace. 
The Government's amicus brief pointed out the error of the lower 
courts in invoking the McDonnell Douglas analysis, although the 
brief based the argument on the direct/circumstantial distinction.3 58 
Professor Brake and I both have noted that the Court's opinion reads 
as if Desert Palace never had been decided. 3 5 9 The Court, while doing 
355. As discussed above, the statements in Abercrombie & Fitch that undermine the 
continuing viability of the McDonnell Douglas analysis are similar to statements made by 
the Court in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 
(2013). See supra Part III.D.2. 
356. I am grateful to Professor Rebecca Hanner White for making the point that the 
pretext analysis could serve this function. 
357. Young v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1353-54 (2015). 
358. "Because petitioner presented direct evidence of sex discrimination, the courts 
below had no need to resort to the analytical framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green .. . which is used to ferret out hidden motives." Brief for the United States as Ami-
cus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9-10, Young, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (No. 12-1226), 2014 WL 
4536939, at *10. 
359. Brake, supra note 40, at 597; William R. Corbett, Young v. United Parcel Service, 
Inc., McDonnell Douglas to the Rescue?, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1683, 1696-98 (2015). 
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creative blending of discrimination theories in Young, nonetheless, 
clung to McDonnell Douglas, as Professor Brake aptly put it, "like a 
child with a favorite blanket."3 6 0 
In Abercrombie & Fitch, the Court held that the plaintiff did not 
have to prove actual knowledge of her religion in a failure-to-
accommodate disparate treatment claim, but instead must prove that 
her religion was a motivating factor in the decision.361 Although the 
Court did not note it, "motivating factor" is the first part of the statu-
tory version of the mixed-motives framework installed in Title VII in 
section 703(m) 36 2 by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The second part is 
the same-decision defense in Section 706(g)(2)(B). 3 6 3 The Court did 
not so much as mention the McDonnell Douglas pretext proof struc-
ture as an option even though it had been invoked by the lower 
courts. 3 6 4 The Court did not seem to view the issue as a choice be-
tween proof structures, but instead a discussion of standards of cau-
sation. Nonetheless, the Court tacitly placed the claim under the 
statutory mixed-motives analysis. Moreover, the Court's statement 
regarding standards of causation explains why the two frameworks 
cannot continue to coexist. The Court stated that Title VII has a "be-
cause of," which means but for, standard of causation in Section 
703(a). 36 5 However, Section 703(m) "relaxes this standard" to "moti-
vating factor." 3 6 6 Although the Court likely did not intend it, that in-
terpretation of the relationship between the two sections should spell 
the end of the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework. 
However, the Court almost certainly will not interpret its state-
ments in Abercrombie & Fitch as signaling the end of the pretext 
analysis. The Court already had made the point about the role of the 
motivating factor standard in 2013 in University of Texas Southwest-
ern Medical Center v. Nassar.3 6 7 In that case, which held that but-for 
causation is required under Title VII's antiretaliation provision and 
no mixed-motives analysis is available, the Court stated as follows: 
360. Brake, supra note 40, at 598. 
361. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 (2015). 
362. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012). 
363. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
364. The district court and the court of appeals had applied versions of the McDonnell 
Douglas analysis that they modified for failure-to-accommodate claims. See Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8, 28, Young, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (No. 
12-1226), 2014 WL 4536939, at *10; EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2028 (2015). The EEOC argued that even if the analysis were correct, "nothing in this 
Court's jurisprudence supports imposing a rigid notice requirement because a burden-
shifting framework is used." Id. at 28-29. 
365. Abercrombie & Fitch, 135 S. Ct. at 2032. 
366. Id. 
367. 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013). 
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"For one thing, § 2000e-2(m) is not itself a substantive bar on dis-
crimination. Rather, it is a rule that establishes the causation stand-
ard for proving a violation defined elsewhere in Title VII."3 6 8 The 
Court's reason for saying this was to undermine the proposition that 
Congress's enactment of a broadly phrased antidiscrimination stat-
ute may indicate congressional intent to prohibit discrimination 
against those who oppose that type of discrimination; the motivating 
factor standard is not such a broad prohibition of discrimination.3 6 9 
Professor Sperino has interpreted those two sentences in Nassar as 
abrogating the distinction between mixed-motives and single-motive 
claims in Title VII.3 7 0 Yet, she observed that Nassar did not reveal 
what to do about the two proof structures for Title VII individual dis-
parate treatment, and speculated that the resilient McDonnell Doug-
las structure was likely to remain viable.371 
Professor Sperino's prediction proved accurate as the Court em-
ployed the pretext analysis in Young in 2015. Then in Abercrom-
bie & Fitch, the Court restated the proposition about motivating fac-
tor from Nassar more pointedly, stating that section 703(m) relaxes 
the standard of causation in section 703(a). 3 7 2 The Court was clear 
that the later-enacted language "relaxes" (replaces) the earlier enact-
ed language. 3 7 3 Furthermore, I think the statements in Nassar and 
Abercrombie & Fitch should not only put an end to the single-
motive/mixed-motives dichotomy, but also should spell the end of the 
pretext framework. I acknowledge that the Court is not likely to see 
it that way, given the reappearance of the pretext structure in Young 
after Nassar. 
The Court has made clear that the statutory language "because of' 
means but-for causation. 3 7 4 Although the Court has never expressly 
stated it, most commentators think that the McDonnell Douglas pre-
text analysis incorporates but-for causation. 3 7 5 A plurality of the 
Court implicitly suggested that proposition in Price Waterhouse, rea-
368. Id. at 2530. 
369. Id. 
370. Sandra F. Sperino, Nassar's Silver Lining, U. CIN. L. REV. F. (2013), 
https://uclawreview.org/2013/10/01/nassars-silver-lining/ [https://perma.cc/UXS7-S57F]. 
371. Id. 
372. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015). 
373. For a similar interpretation of later-enacted language superseding or replacing 
earlier-enacted language in ERISA, see Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. 
Ct. 1652, 1658 (2017). 
374. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528 (2013); Gross v. FBL 
Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009). 
375. See, e.g., Steven J. Kaminshine, Disparate Treatment as a Theory of Discrimina-
tion: The Need for a Restatement, Not a Revolution, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 17-18 (2005); 
Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 123 (2007). 
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soning that "because of' does not mean "but for" and developing an 
alternative analysis to McDonnell Douglas.37 6 But-for causation is the 
standard of causation under the ADEA after Gross, and the Court 
has applied the McDonnell Douglas analysis in ADEA cases, alt-
hough stating that it has never decided whether the analysis is ap-
plicable.3 7 7 But-for causation may be required under the ADA, and 
the Court also applied the McDonnell Douglas framework in an ADA 
case, stating only that the courts of appeals consistently have applied 
the structure to evaluate disparate treatment claims, including ADA 
claims, on motions for summary judgment. 3 78 Despite no definitive 
holding from the Court, there are indications that the standard of 
causation associated with the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis is 
but for. At a minimum, the development of the mixed-motives analy-
sis as an alternative suggests that the causation standard of the pre-
text analysis is higher than motivating factor. If that is correct, then 
the pretext framework should cease to exist as a parallel framework 
to the statutory mixed-motives framework under Title VII. 
After the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Desert 
Palace, it was arguable that there were two standards of causation in 
Title VII: "because of'/but for in section 703(a) and "motivating fac-
tor" in section 703(m). Some courts employed that approach to draw a 
new line of demarcation and justify the continued existence of the 
pretext analysis, which was used in "because of'/but-for claims. For 
example, the Sixth Circuit used that approach in White v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp.,3 7 9 labeling claims brought pursuant to section 
703(a) single-motive claims and claims brought pursuant to section 
703(m) mixed-motive claims. 3 8 0 Now that the Court has explained, in 
Nassar and Abercrombie & Fitch, that "because of' and "motivating 
376. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1989). 
377. See Gross, 557 U.S. at 175 n.2 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 
530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000)); O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 
(1996)). 
378. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 n.3 (2003) (citing Pugh v. Attica, 259 
F.3d 619, 626 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
379. 533 F.3d 381, 400 n.10 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1235 (2009). The 
court stated: 
However, as is clear from [an earlier part of this opinion], the McDonnell 
Douglas/Burdine framework continues to guide our summary judgment analy-
sis of single-motive discrimination claims brought pursuant only to Title VII's 
general anti-discrimination provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and not pursu-
ant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). We decline to adopt the view, proposed by some 
courts and commentators, that the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework has 
ceased to exist entirely following Desert Palace. 
380. The Eleventh Circuit purported to adopt the Sixth Circuit's approach from White 
in Quigg v. Thomas County School District, 814 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2016). 
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factor" are not two different standards of causation in Title VII, but 
rather that section 703(m) relaxes the but-for standard of section 
703(a), the pretext analysis must be abandoned. The three stages of 
the pretext analysis no longer can have significant procedural effects. 
If a plaintiff can satisfy "motivating factor," that plaintiff cannot be 
required to prove pretext, nor can a defendant be precluded from 
raising the second part of the mixed-motives framework-the same-
decision defense. 
However, it can be argued that, notwithstanding the relaxation of 
the causation standard in Title VII, the pretext analysis can be re-
tained as a way for plaintiffs to present their evidence to establish 
motivating factor.381 While that is true, such retention likely will lead 
to incorrect results because courts will misunderstand the new role of 
the analysis and accord it the significance it had in the past. The fact 
that the ultimate question is whether race or sex was a motivating 
factor deprives the three stages of the pretext analysis of procedural 
significance. If a plaintiff fails to prove pretext, that is not determi-
native, as the plaintiff still might satisfy motivating factor causation. 
Retaining the pretext analysis means only that a plaintiff may pre-
sent evidence to establish pretext, and that should satisfy motivating 
factor. However, it is not necessary to retain the pretext proof struc-
ture to assure that pretext evidence is admissible, relevant, and pro-
bative. Retaining such analysis suggests that it has its former proce-
dural effects, and that is incorrect. Retaining this analysis to assure, 
unnecessarily, that pretext evidence is considered as proof of motivat-
ing factor is likely to result in courts giving it the procedural effects it 
no longer can have. 
As with the dichotomy of theories (disparate treatment and dispar-
ate impact), the myth of the dichotomy of individual disparate treat-
ment proof structures is not innocuous. Confusion and uncertainty 
about the proof frameworks are harmful in a most practical way. The 
frameworks are the tools used to do the everyday work of courts-to 
analyze claims for purposes of various dispositive motions and stages 
of litigation, such as summary judgment, judgment as a matter of law, 
and jury instructions. If attorneys and judges cannot determine which 
framework is appropriate for a given case or do not know how to apply 
the frameworks, we have no consistent, dependable law to resolve cas-
es. Moreover, once a claim is slotted under a theory and a proof struc-
ture, the evidence introduced must fit within that proof structure; if 
the evidence does not conform to the elements, it may be disregarded 
or regarded as not sufficiently probative of discrimination. 
381. See Sperino, Nassar's Silver Lining, supra note 370. 
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The Seventh Circuit explained the dangers of requiring evi-
dence to conform to ill-fitting proof frameworks and of applying 
overly rigid structures in Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc .382 In 
that case, the Seventh Circuit reversed a grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of a defendant in a discrimination case in which the 
district court had divided evidence between the direct and indirect 
methods of proving discrimination and determined that the plain-
tiff failed to create a "convincing mosaic of discrimination" under 
either method. 3 83 First, the appellate court explained that the 
"convincing mosaic" language, articulated by the Seventh Circuit 
in Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 3 8 4 was intended to be a meta-
phor for a court's consideration of the evidence rather than a new 
test that had to be satisfied by plaintiffs. 3 8 5 Instead, in the after-
math of Troupe, courts treated it as a new test. The Ortiz court 
reiterated that "convincing mosaic" is not a legal test and over-
ruled a series of Seventh Circuit cases to the extent that they re-
lied on it as such. 386 Next, the Seventh Circuit trained its sights on 
the direct and indirect methods of proving discrimination and de-
clared that courts must cease from classifying evidence as direct or 
indirect and treating such evidence as subject to distinct ap-
proaches. 3 8 7 The court stated that the legal standard is "simply 
whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to con-
clude that the plaintiffs race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other pro-
scribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse employment 
action." 3 8 8 "Evidence is evidence," the court stated, and should be 
considered as a whole. 3 8 9 Having explained well the problems 
posed by the dichotomy of proof structures, however, the court 
then asserted that all that it had said did not affect the McDonnell 
Douglas framework or "any other burden-shifting framework, no 
matter what it is called as a shorthand." 3 9 0 Although the court pro-
fessed to want a unified analysis, it was unwilling to explain the 
relationship between the pretext and mixed-motives proof struc-
tures, ending much as the Supreme Court did in Desert Palace. 
However, the court did go on to assess the evidence under the 
standard it stated-whether a reasonable juror could infer that 
382. 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016). 
383. Id. at 763. 
384. 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994). 
385. Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 764. 
386. Id. at 765. 
387. Id. at 765-66. 
388. Id. at 765. 
389. Id. 
390. Id. at 766. 
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the employer took the adverse action based on ethnicity-and un-
der that standard, reversed the summary judgment. 3 9 1 Although 
the Seventh Circuit flinched in Ortiz, based on its reverence for 
McDonnell Douglas, rather than solve the two-proof-structure co-
nundrum, it noted the mismanagement of evidence that can occur 
with the current dichotomy of proof structures. 
The dichotomy of individual disparate treatment proof frame-
works is obsolete, and the Court twice has stated the reason, based 
on the statutes, why it should be abrogated. 
V. BREAKING THE DICHOTOMIES AND RECOGNIZING ADDITIONAL 
THEORIES 
Young and Abercrombie & Fitch are the latest indications that the 
supposed order in employment discrimination law is chimerical. The 
core of employment discrimination law based on dichotomies of theo-
ries and disparate treatment proof structures is not required or nec-
essarily supported by the statutes; it is not descriptive of the doctrine 
that has developed and evolved; and it is not sufficient to address the 
discrimination that occurs in the workplace today. That core is in-
stead a relic from the early years of employment discrimination law 
to which the Court and lower courts tenaciously have clung.39 2 Young 
and Abercrombie & Fitch both expose the myth and demonstrate that 
the Court can use the existing statutes and case law doctrine to fash-
ion a new core of discrimination law doctrine that is unconstrained 
by the dichotomies. Yet, the Court's contrived adherence to the old 
order in the two opinions suggests its reluctance to embrace this path 
forward. 
A. Movement Must Begin with the Court 
Movement in the direction of breaking the dichotomies of theories 
and proof frameworks and recognizing more theories of discrimina-
tion almost certainly must be initiated by the Court. The history of 
the evolution of employment discrimination law over fifty years is an 
interaction in which the Court declares doctrine in the first instance, 
and Congress occasionally steps in to modify and codify. 39 3 Congress 
undoubtedly will not intervene at this point in response to Young and 
391. Id. 
392. Professor Blumrosen, in describing the three early concepts of discrimination, 
aptly observed that those concepts "represent ways of thought that possess a long jurispru-
dential history and are embedded in the attitudes of lawyers," and "[o]nce a concept is 
grasped, it is often applied without conscious awareness of or reference to its genesis." 
Blumrosen, supra note 60, at 71. 
393. See supra Part W.A. 
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Abercrombie & Fitch because the Court purported to be making no 
significant changes in discrimination doctrine. 
Congress's amendments to Title VII indicate that Congress has 
accepted the Court's model of employment discrimination law as 
composed of a well-defined dichotomy of theories. So, what would 
Congress likely do if the Court announced the end of the dichotomy of 
theories? There is reason to believe that Congress also would accept 
decisions of the Court announcing that employment discrimination 
law does not consist of merely a well-defined dichotomy of theories. 
Although it is true that many amendments to the employment dis-
crimination statutes have been legislative abrogations of Supreme 
Court decisions, Congress has codified some of the Court's most sig-
nificant concepts and principles and left many others undisturbed. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified versions of the disparate-impact 
and mixed-motives frameworks developed by the Court.394 Congress 
did not disturb the gender stereotyping concept announced by the 
Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 395 in the 1991 Act, even though 
Congress, in the Act, was tinkering with the mixed-motives frame-
work announced in that case. Congress disturbed neither the hostile 
environment theory of sexual harassment accepted by the Court in 
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson396 nor the recognition of same-sex 
sexual harassment in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.3 9 7 
There are many other examples. Suffice it to say that Congress gen-
erally follows the lead of the Court in matters of employment dis-
crimination law. Most of the congressional amendments overturning 
Supreme Court decisions have been responses to decisions that nar-
rowed or reduced the protections of the laws. Consider, for example, 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act Amendments, the religious ac-
commodation amendment, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008.398 If the Court chose to abrogate the di-
chotomy of theories and expand employment discrimination law, it 
seems unlikely that Congress would intervene to prevent such 
change. Beyond nonintervention, Congress may choose to assist. 
In sum, the Court could, to a significant extent, abolish the di-
chotomies of theories and proof structures and recognize new theories 
under the existing statutes. Although the courts can accomplish 
much of this change under the existing statutes, there are a number 
of amendments that Congress could make to facilitate these changes, 
394. Id. 
395. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
396. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
397. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
398. See supra Part W.A. 
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but such action will not occur without a declaration of change by the 
Court. 
B. The Court Could Begin Building the New Core on the Existing 
Statutes 
1. Blending Theories 
Despite its protestations to the contrary, the Court breached the 
dichotomy of disparate treatment and disparate impact in Young and 
Abercrombie & Fitch. The next step should be to admit that plaintiffs 
pursuing a disparate treatment claim can invoke principles and case 
law of disparate impact and vice versa. There are only two statutory 
provisions that require some separation and distinctiveness between 
the theories,399 and neither prevents the courts from substantial 
blending of theories. 
The most obvious example of blending is recognizing that evidence 
should not be considered treatment-type evidence or impact-type evi-
dence. That is, a particular type of evidence is not required to prove 
intent or impact. The Court stated that evidence of an unjustified 
impact could prove intent in Young.400 Nonetheless, the EEOC's effort 
to use effects evidence to prove intent in Catastrophe Management 
Solutions failed.401 
Circuit courts already have accorded decisive weight to impact-
type evidence and formulated standards using impact language in 
disparate treatment claims in some contexts. Consider, for example, 
rules or policies that facially discriminate based on sex for which 
courts do not necessarily find disparate treatment because the rules 
do not impose unequal burdens. Circuit courts have applied such 
mixed standards in the context of dress and grooming policies and 
physical fitness tests. 
The Ninth Circuit approved a test for determining whether an ap-
pearance and grooming policy with different requirements based on 
sex violates the law in Jesperson v. Harrah's Operating Co. 4 0 2 The 
"Personal Best" program at issue made several distinctions and, at 
issue in the case, required women but not men to wear makeup to 
399. There is only one statutory provision that expressly prohibits such blending. As 
amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, section 703(k)(2) provides that business necessity 
cannot be used as a defense to a claim of intentional discrimination. There also is the pro-
vision in section 1981a that makes damages available for intentional discrimination claims 
but not disparate impact claims. See infra Part V.C. 
400. See supra Part III.A & III.D.1. 
401. See supra Part III.E. 
402. 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
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work. 40 3 The policy facially discriminated, but the court announced 
that the standard for determining illegal sex discrimination is 
whether the rule or policy creates an unequal burden on one sex.4 0 4 
The Fourth Circuit applied an equality-of-burdens test to a gen-
der-normed physical fitness test administered by the FBI in Bauer v. 
Lynch.40 5 The passing standard required a different number of push-
ups and sit-ups, and a different time in both a 300-meter sprint and 
a one-and-a-half mile run for men and women. 4 06 The standard was 
facially discriminatory and appeared to violate section 703(1) of Title 
VII,4 0 7 which prohibits adjustment of test scores or different cutoff 
scores based on protected characteristics. The district court granted 
summary judgment for the plaintiff, reasoning that the different cut-
offs were facially discriminatory and not saved by any defense. 4 0 8 The 
Fourth Circuit declared that "[m]en and women simply are not phys-
iologically the same for the purposes of physical fitness programs."4 0 9 
The court reversed the summary judgment, holding that such a gen-
der-normed fitness test is not illegal if it imposes an equal burden of 
compliance on men and women and requires the same level of fitness 
for both.4 1 0 
More significant than blended tests, standards, and evidence, the 
flexibility permitted by breaking the dichotomy and blending theories 
also should permit courts to recognize recovery for failure to make 
reasonable accommodations for race, color, sex, and national origin 
under Title VII and age under the ADEA. The Court permitted plain-
tiffs to proceed with what were essentially a pregnancy accommoda-
tion claim in Young and a religion accommodation claim in Aber-
crombie & Fitch in part by infusing disparate treatment with dispar-
ate impact principles. 4 1 1 Although Title VII has definition subsections 
for pregnancy and religion, with the pregnancy provision implicitly 
suggesting a requirement of accommodation and the religion provi-
sion expressly providing for it, the Court permitted both claims to 
proceed under disparate treatment without recognizing a separate 
403. Id. at 1107. 
404. Id. at 1110-11. 
405. 812 F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 372 (2016). 
406. Id. at 344. 
407. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l) (2012). 
408. Bauer, 812 F.3d at 346 (recounting the district court's ruling). 
409. Id. at 350. 
410. Id. at 351. 
411. It should not be surprising that the blending of theories facilitated maintenance of 
failure-to-accommodate claims, as disparate impact derives more from accommodation 
theory than from equal treatment or animus-based theories. See Jolls, supra note 237, at 
645. 
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"cause of action" for failure to accommodate. 4 12 If nonaccommodation 
is cognizable under disparate treatment, then it should be recognized 
for all of the protected characteristics. 
Beyond the Young and Abercrombie & Fitch decisions permitting 
nonaccommodation claims to proceed under disparate treatment, 
there is another reason that expansion of nonaccommodation claims 
should require no express statutory provision. The Court and lower 
courts have recognized other types of employment discrimination 
claims without express authorization in the statute, such as harass-
ment and stereotyping. Another example of a claim recognized under 
Title VII without express statutory authorization is associational or 
relational discrimination. The ADA makes it an unlawful employ-
ment practice for an employer to discriminate against an employee 
because of her relationship or association with a person who has a 
known disability.4 1 3 Although Title VII does not expressly provide for 
such an associational discrimination claim, appellate courts have 
recognized it for race.4 1 4 Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized an 
associational or relational claim under the antiretaliation provision, 
without express statutory authorization in Title VII, in Thompson u. 
North American Stainless, LP.4 1 5 Thus, it should be no bar to expan-
sion of nonaccommodation claims that there is not an express statu-
tory provision for nonaccommodation claims for race, color, sex, na-
tional origin, or age. 
2. Recognizing More Than Two Theories or Causes of Action 
The Court should abandon the notion, articulated in Abercrom-
bie & Fitch, that there are only two theories or causes of action for 
discrimination under Title VII and presumably the ADEA. 4 1 6 As al-
ready discussed, the Court and courts have recognized several differ-
ent causes of action, including harassment, stereotyping, and nonac-
commodation, that do not fit well under either disparate treatment or 
412. Young v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1344 (2015); EEOC v. Aber-
crombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031-32 (2015). 
413. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (2012). 
414. See, e.g., Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 
1986); Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 589 (5th Cir. 1998); 
Ellis v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 523 F.3d 823, 828 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Victoria 
Schwartz, Title VII: A Shift from Sex to Relationships, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 209 (2012) 
(discussing race associational discrimination claims). 
415. 562 U.S. 170 (2011). 
416. There appear to be more causes of action expressly provided for in the ADA. See 
42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012). However, one could argue that section 1981a's provision making 
compensatory and punitive damages available under the ADA for intentional discrimina-
tion, but not disparate impact, cuts against that interpretation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) 
(2012). 
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disparate impact. 4 1 7 Declaring that there are only two theories ena-
bles the Court to invoke absolute separation of principles and force 
claims into the affiliated proof frameworks. If the Court is willing to 
abandon the dichotomy of two theories, it does not jeopardize the es-
tablished order to recognize forthrightly that there are several theo-
ries or causes of action. The Court should expressly recognize that it 
permits recovery for discrimination based on intent and negligence 
and continue to permit the development of analyses and principles 
that facilitate evaluation of claims, such as the frameworks for har-
assment claims 41 8 and failure-to-accommodate claims. 41 9 However, as 
the Court often has declared, the ultimate issue in cases is whether 
an adverse employment action was taken because of a protected 
characteristic of the claimant,4 20 and that question changes in light of 
the Abercrombie & Fitch declaration regarding a relaxed causation 
standard in Title VII to whether discrimination was a "motivating 
factor" in the adverse employment action. 
Recognizing multiple theories faces one statutory impediment. As 
long as section 1981a distinguishes between "intentional discrimina-
tion" and "disparate impact" for purposes of damages and the right to 
a jury trial, all theories or causes of action will have to be labeled as 
either "intentional" or "disparate impact." This is not an impediment 
to recognition of different theories because claims that the Court does 
not label as "disparate impact" necessarily come under "intentional." 
Yet, so that the terms used in discrimination doctrine comport with 
generally accepted meanings, Congress should amend section 1981a 
as described below to eliminate this "intentional"/ "disparate impact" 
distinction. 
3. Abrogating Pretext and Adopting the Uniform Analysis of 
Mixed Motives for all Title VII Claims Except Disparate Impact 
Many have argued that Desert Palace could or should have ended 
the dichotomy of proof frameworks. 4 2 1 Since Abercrombie & Fitch 
pronounced (for the second time)4 2 2 the relaxed standard of causation 
417. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
418. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (establishing a 
framework for analyzing claims of supervisor sexual harassment). 
419. See, e.g., Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc'ns, 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995) (setting out the 
elements for a claim for failure to make reasonable accommodations for religion). 
420. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 518 (1993) (stating that 
"the ultimate question [is] discrimination vel non") (quoting U. S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Gov-
ernors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1981)); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 
577 (1978). 
421. See supra note 114. 
422. The Court's first such pronouncement was in Nassar. See supra notes 367-70. 
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in Title VII, the Court should now dispense with the McDonnell 
Douglas framework and declare the statutory mixed-motives frame-
work as applicable to all Title VII intentional discrimination claims, 
meaning non-disparate impact cases. 4 2 3 All such Title VII cases thus 
would be evaluated under section 703(m)'s "motivating factor" stand-
ard, subject to the same-decision defense of section 706(g)(2)(B), 
which limits remedies if the defendant satisfies its burden. The ulti-
mate question thus focuses specifically, as the Court in Abercrom-
bie & Fitch explained, on whether the protected characteristic was a 
motivating factor of the employer's adverse action. 
The Court could achieve more uniformity by also adopting the 
mixed-motives analysis to resolve causation issues in Title VII retali-
ation claims under section 704,424 but to do so the Court would have 
to overrule University of Texas Southwest Medical Center v. Nas-
sar.42 5 The Court could achieve even greater uniformity by making 
the mixed-motives analysis applicable to ADEA claims, which would 
require overruling Gross v. FBL Financial Services.42 6 
No congressional action is needed to dispatch with the McDonnell 
Douglas analysis. It is a creation of case law and has never been codi-
fied. The mixed-motives analysis, on the other hand, was codified in 
Title VII by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The surviving framework 
must be the statutory one. 
C. Congress Could Facilitate Building the New Core by Amending 
the Statutes 
As discussed, the Court and lower courts could work with the ex-
isting statutes to rebuild a workable core, breaking from the old di-
chotomy of theories. However, one amendment to the statutes could 
facilitate the movement. Congress could amend the statutes in addi-
tional ways to remove all vestiges of the dichotomies, but those more 
extensive amendments raise difficult questions and suggest compre-
423. A logical extension of my arguments regarding blending of theories is that there 
be a uniform standard of causation across theories. Congress began with the same "because 
of' language applicable to all claims in sections 703 and 704 of Title VII. I think there is a 
basis for this uniform standard now. The Court's declaration in Abercrombie & Fitch that 
section 703(m) relaxes the standard of causation in section 703(a) suggests that the moti-
vating factor standard applies to disparate treatment and disparate impact claims under 
section 703(a). Although there are ways of interpreting around this, it is not an unreasona-
ble interpretation of the language of section 703(m) and the relaxed causation statement of 
Abercrombie & Fitch. If a uniform standard of causation were to be adopted for all theories 
of discrimination, however, it seems unlikely that "motivating factor" would suffice, as the 
focus is on motive. 
424. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012). 
425. 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). 
426. 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
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hensive revision of the employment discrimination laws. While I have 
argued that we have reached a point in the life cycle of our laws 
where such revision is needed, 4 27 1 also have admitted that such revi-
sion is unlikely to happen. 42 8 Moreover, some amendments that elim-
inate aspects of the dichotomy of theories should await consideration 
and development in the Court. What I propose, then, rather than 
comprehensive reform is a specific amendment that would remove 
statutory recognition of the dichotomy of theories and would permit 
express recognition of various theories. I will mention other amend-
ments that could follow later after doctrine develops in the courts. 
The amendment most obviously needed is removal of the most 
prominent codification of the dichotomy: the provision in section 
1981a of compensatory and punitive damages and a concomitant 
right to a jury trial for intentional discrimination claims, meaning 
claims not based on disparate impact. Only one amendment would 
completely eradicate the dichotomy of theories and the need to cate-
gorize claims-removing the reference to the theories from the stat-
ute. Congress could amend the statute to make damages and jury 
trials available for all employment discrimination claims. I consider 
this the preferable amendment because it is most consistent with 
abolishing the dichotomy of theories and recognizing a variety of the-
ories. Moreover, this change is most consistent with current law, as 
most claims now come within the definition of intentional discrimina-
tion, meaning not disparate impact.429 Furthermore, the limitation of 
damages to intentional discrimination claims is not a result of careful 
consideration by Congress of under what circumstances damages 
should be available in discrimination cases. Instead, it resulted from 
the availability of damages under section 1981430 for race cases, and 
the Court's interpretation that disparate impact claims are not cog-
nizable under section 1981.431 If, however, Congress were unwilling to 
make damages available for all employment discrimination cases, it 
is possible to craft other amendments that delete references to "in-
tentional discrimination" and "disparate impact." The approaches 
427. See William R. Corbett, What Is Troubling About the Tortification of Employment 
Discrimination Law?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1027, 1058-61 (2014); William R. Corbett, Calling 
on Congress: Take a Page from Parliament's Playbook and Fix Employment Discrimination 
Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 135 (2013). 
428. See supra note 427. 
429. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
430. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012). 
431. Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (2002). See H.R. REP. 
No. 102-40, at 2-4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 717 ("It is the Committee's 
intention that damages should be awarded under Title VII in the same circumstances in 
which such awards are now permitted under U.S.C. [§] 1981 in intentional race discrimina-
tion cases."). 
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would be establishing a standard for proving into or out of damages. 
Because the vast majority of claims now fit under the category of in-
tentional, not disparate impact, the approach that is more consistent 
with both the current state of the law and Congress's purpose in the 
1991 Act is to provide for damages unless a defendant proves it is 
entitled to avoid them. An example of this approach is found in the 
Fair Labor Standards Act, 4 3 2 in which liquidated damages are availa-
ble unless the defendant satisfies the burden of proving it was "in 
good faith" and "had reasonable grounds for believing" that it was not 
violating the Act. 4 3 3 This approach also would be consistent with 
Congress's adoption in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 of the "same-
decision defense" under the statutory mixed-motives analysis in sec-
tion 706(g)(2)(B). 4 3 4 Under this defense, a plaintiff is entitled to all 
relief available, including damages, unless a defendant can prove out 
of such relief by establishing that it would have taken the same ac-
tion "in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor."4 3 5 A dif-
ferent approach, and one that seems less consistent with the purpose 
of the 1991 Act and current law, is to require plaintiffs to prove enti-
tlement to damages. The ADEA, for example, provides for liquidated 
damages in cases of "willful violations." 4 3 6 Similarly, section 1981a 
authorizes recovery of punitive damages only if an employer commits 
an unlawful practice "with malice or with reckless indifference." 4 3 7 
Thus, there are several different amendments that could be made in 
section 1981a to create availability of damages and jury trials on a 
basis other than the distinction between intentional discrimination 
and disparate impact claims. 
A second statutory recognition of the dichotomy between treat-
ment and impact is the prohibition on using business necessity as a 
defense to a claim of intentional discrimination in section 703(k)(2). 4 3 8 
The Court articulated this principle in UAW v. Johnson Controls,439 
and Congress codified it in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The underly-
ing idea is that the statutory defense of bona fide occupational quali-
fication4 4 0 is a defense to disparate treatment, and that defense 
432. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2012). 
433. Id. § 260 (2012). 
434. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012). 
435. Id. 
436. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2012). The Supreme Court interpreted "willful" as meaning 
that the employer "knew or showed reckless disregard" for whether its conduct violated the 
ADEA. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 126 (1985). 
437. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (2012). 
438. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2) (2012). 
439. 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
440. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012). 
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should be more difficult to satisfy than the defense to disparate im-
pact (business necessity and job relatedness). Although this statutory 
provision does maintain the dichotomy to the extent of providing for 
distinct defenses for treatment and impact, the matter of a uniform 
defense within Title VII, let alone the ADEA and the ADA, which 
have different defenses,'441 is a game that is not worth the candle at 
this point. Attempting to create a uniform defense in Title VII alone 
necessarily would raise the issue of the codification of the entire dis-
parate impact framework in section 703(k) by the 1991 Act because it 
codifies the stages of business necessity/job relatedness 442 and alter-
native employment practice. 4 4 3 Thus, purging the statutes of all ves-
tiges of the dichotomy of theories tends toward a comprehensive re-
consideration and revision of the employment discrimination laws 
that could harmonize Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA. While I ad-
vocate such a comprehensive revision, it should, and undoubtedly 
will, await some doctrinal movement and changes by the Court.444 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The core of employment discrimination law is a dichotomy of theo-
ries of discrimination purportedly embodied in distinct statutory sec-
tions of Title VII. The theories and all principles associated with 
them must be kept separate. There are proof frameworks associated 
with each of the theories. They, too, are distinct. Every discrimina-
tion claim must be evaluated by categorizing it under a theory and 
then funneling the evidence into a proof structure. The two theories 
of discrimination are exclusive; all claims must come under one of the 
two. This is the rigid structure at the core of employment discrimina-
tion law. 
In 2015, the Court's decisions in Young and Abercrombie & Fitch 
exposed the destabilized core as the majority opinions blended prin-
ciples of the two theories and applied one disparate treatment proof 
441. The ADEA's defense to disparate impact is, by Court interpretation, "reasonable 
factors other than age" set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 623(f. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 
228, 239 (2005). The ADA has a defense of direct threat. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2012). This 
ADA defense seems roughly analogous to the bona fide occupational requirement (BFOQ) 
defense of Title VII and the ADEA, but it likely is not as broad, requiring individualized 
analysis rather than blanket exclusion as permitted under BFOQ. See Ann Hubbard, The 
ADA, the Workplace, and the Myth of the "Dangerous Mentally Ill," 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
849, 894 (2001). 
442. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
443. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii). 
444. An amendment of Title VII and the ADEA, modeled on the ADA prohibition of 
discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 12112, could prompt the Supreme Court to recognize multiple 
theories of discrimination. However, I think there is almost no chance that Congress would 
take the lead in enacting such an amendment. 
831 20181 BREAKING DICHOTOMIES 
framework in each case while undermining the continuing viability of 
McDonnell Douglas. Nonetheless, the Court declared the exclusivity 
of the two theories and insisted that is was maintaining the dichoto-
my. The Court further undermined the case for the dichotomy when 
it told a new version of the story of the two subsections of Title VII 
from which the theories emanate in Inclusive Communities. 
Considering theories of discrimination, it is not surprising that it 
was two cases involving failure-to-accommodate claims that prompt-
ed the Court to blend theories. Accommodation does not fit neatly 
within treatment or impact. Moreover, Congress's incorporation of 
accommodation provisions into definitional sections of Title VII per-
mitted the Court to attempt to fit the accommodation claims within 
disparate treatment rather than to recognize another freestanding 
theory of discrimination. 
The Court's 2015 opinions in Young and Abercrombie & Fitch re-
veal that the myth of the dichotomy of theories and proof structures 
is no longer viable. However, rather than dreading the potential for 
chaos in employment discrimination law, we should welcome the po-
tential for innovation and creativity that lurks in Young and Aber-
crombie & Fitch. Some help is needed from Congress to amend the 
employment discrimination statutes. In the meantime, the Supreme 
Court could fashion a new core that is supported by the statutes and 
is not tethered to a dichotomy of theories or proof frameworks. But, 
to do so the Court must recognize the inadequacy of the accidental 
dichotomies and move past them. The Court could not bring itself to 
do so in Young and Abercrombie & Fitch. 
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